Women, Families and Social Welfare in Spain from the 18th Century to the Present

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Introduction

Most historians coincide when they emphasize that a Welfare State (WS) has only existed in Spain since 1978, after the end of Franco’s dictatorship. A modern WS was established very rapidly in Spain. A significant group of Spanish politicians hoped to imitate a WS model when the triumph of neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism in the western world made people question the convenience of the WS itself. In spite of the governments’ efforts to consolidate the WS between 1978 and 1993, the experts (and public opinion) in Spain were then assuring that a large part of Social Welfare (SW) came from families. This explained, for example, that Spain was able to support high unemployment rates (22% in 1993) with insufficient aid from the State. These views have been shared by authors who differed greatly when considering the need for the WS1. In any case, they also agreed that when families are referred to, this means that this task was taken on by women.

This text is an interpretive essay which studies a long-term historical social problem based on a recent historiography. Its analysis is, above all, qualitative and even more so with regards to the period before 1940, for there are still no full statistics on the evolution of Public Social Expenditure (in spite of very recent valuable contributions)2; as far as I know, there is none on invisible family contributions in national accounts. Although they are implicitly present, theoretical questions are not dealt with here. Examples of these are about whether it would be better to talk about WS regimes or systems before talking about WS, if the WS is one of the great

1 I. e., Pérez, V., “Sistema de Bienestar, familia y una estrategia liberal-comunitaria” in Fernández, J. M. et al., Las estructuras del bienestar en Europa (Madrid, 2000), 745–760; Navarro, V., Bienestar insuficiente, democracia incompleta (Barcelona, 2002). It has been written so much about this subject in contemporary Spanish historiography that bibliographical references have been reduced as much as possible.

contributions that are impossible to eliminate from the European civilization, if it is of any use to talk about the WS “models”, whether a fourth southern European model\(^3\) should be added to the three known models of some author,\(^4\) if familism is characteristic of some European societies, etc.\(^5\)

This text criticizes revisionist interpretations of Spanish history made in the last few years which contradict what documentary evidence from the past confirms. In assumption that Spain was supposedly the “eighth” industrial country in the developed world in the beginning of 21\(^{st}\) century, these interpretations stated that its historical trajectory in the last two centuries was normal in Europe. My approach is based on the fact that this would only be true if the Continent were only reduced to its outlying countries, and even more to its southern area. Finally, asserting that families were historically the main social protection resource to poverty has been very well-known in historiography, at least for several decades.\(^6\) However, as far as I know, no study has been printed in Spanish historiography analyzing this subject in the long term\(^7\). The only modest aim of this text is to show a genealogy of that process.

The Unsuccessful Attempts to Reform Traditional Charity in the 18\(^{th}\) Century

Spanish Governments had been introducing these reforms particularly after 1766. In that year, there were significant popular revolts as a result of high food prices, among other reasons. Some optimistic versions of the Enlightenment were confident that poverty would easily come to an end, because the main problem was that a large part of the Spanish population was unemployed. Everything would change if

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7 This text is to a large extent the result of my point of view about ideas discussed with professors P. Carasa and M. Carbonell during some joint research a few years ago. I am in debt with these professors who know much more than me about this topic; cf. Carasa, P., Carbonell, M., Gracia, J., “Family Strategies, Gender and the Use of Public Services to Secure Well-being in Spain, 18th–20th centuries”, Third Symposium of COST Action A34, 2007 http://www.ub.edu/tig/GWBNet/BcnPapers/Carasa_Carbonell_Gracia_2007.pdf.
that population began to work. Apart from SW, there were laws concerning the “traditional” social problem in the Old Regime—the dangerous paupers, such as, for example, tramps. Inevitably, a solution was to force them to join the army. Governments boosted the creation of poorhouses to “correct” other paupers. In this case, teaching children and professional education for youths were stressed. Obviously, these punitive measures were insufficient. More work for women was also promoted, albeit for it to be done in their homes.

We shall not discuss the traditional charity in the Old Regime, but it was clearly insufficient for attending to people in need. Also, the idea that the artisan guilds, religious brotherhoods, Catholic Church, etc. gave significant contributions to SW is wrong; that idea came from 19th century anti-liberal essayists who defended an idealized vision of the Old Regime which really only existed in their imagination.

What is true is that governments of the end of the 18th century promoted Home Welfare in cities, at the expense of the town councils. This meant giving aid to families, and therefore women in them were those who were in charge of managing it. The inexistence of a “real” State (in a contemporary sense) during the Old Regime had made the town councils traditionally take charge of helping poor “respectable” families. Whether these social services were public, at least in a current sense of the “public” concept, is debatable. Also, the aid provided by the town halls did not always come from taxes or other public resources, but, in many cases, it came from donations, testamentary legacies... offered by the urban elite classes, or from charitable collections promoted (and managed) by those elite classes. This model of municipal home charity continued in the 19th century, and even a long time afterwards. For centuries the importance of the authorities created in the 18th century stood out in the city neighbourhoods (“mayors and neighbourhood messengers”) for informing the town halls of poor people’s needs.

Obviously a large number of the people who received social aid were women, but it does not make sense to emphasize a “feminization of poverty”, for it is a topic
well-known by all historians.\textsuperscript{13} It is also well-known that some family models gave more protection than others: in Spain, the most protective families (the large ones) were located especially in areas near the Cantabrian Sea and the Pyrenees. There were family strategies which prevented poverty and which were well-known in the Atlantic European countries (putting back the age to get married, a high percentage of women who finally remained single, etc.). On the other hand, it is interesting to see that almost 10\% of the “Aid Associations” in Madrid were exclusively made up of women during the 18th century.\textsuperscript{14} Although the geographic area was different, the 1904 official statistics (not too exact, on the other hand) showed only 2.4\% of Spanish Mutual Aid Societies (similar to Friendly Societies) made up by women.

It would make no sense to exaggerate the importance of Social Aid in the Old Regime compared to the self-help developed by the families or persons themselves to achieve their well-being. In this way, in the face of a traditional historiography that pointed out the charity foundations that provided single youths with dowries for them to be able to get married, some urban study points out that scarcely 9\% of the young women had access to them in the 18th century; faced with this, 70\% of the working women in that city were servants whose major objective was to obtain a dowry to be able to get married.\textsuperscript{15}

The 19th Century: from a State’s Non-Intervention to the Beginning of a Social Reform

We still do not quite know how SW was set up (or should we say, the lack of it?) after the Liberal Revolution before the end of the 19th century,\textsuperscript{16} in spite of some valuable regional studies.\textsuperscript{17} Although a recent revisionist historiography affirms the opposite, what does seem to be clear is that, in Spain (in comparison with the west European countries which went through a very significant early industrialization), there were no great problems of modern poverty in cities until the final decades of the 19th century. This would be due to the scant industrial development, except in

\begin{itemize}
  \item[13] Carbonell, M., \textit{Sobreviure a Barcelona: dones, pobresa iassistència al segle XVIII} (Barcelona, 1997).
\end{itemize}
very specific cities and regional centres for periods that were not always long-lasting. This is why an 1849 State survey only dealt with the social condition of farmers and their possibility of obtaining credit. The fact is that the 1848 revolution hardly had any effect on Spain’s Social history (although it did affect Intellectual history).

The persistence of the *Old Regime’s SW* models was considerable during a large part of the 19th century. Apart from the nationalization of the Church’s assets in the First Liberal Revolution and other very specific episodes of the most radical liberalism, an early Agreement (*Concordat*) with the Vatican State in 1851 allowed Catholics to keep their influence, except in very short periods when there were anti-clerical progressive governments (1820–23, 1836–37, 1840–43, 1854-56, 1868–74…). Until the end of the 19th century, the conservative governments defended the liberal abstention principles of the Minimum State in social problems, and, as in the past, they left the town halls to take care of them. So, statistics from 1856 (also of doubtful reliability), excluding the private charity institutions, showed the following data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charity institutions</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>868</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following these statistics, it was more significant that while 170,000 men and women were helped in institutions, there were 714,894 home-help services. Therefore, the predominant public assistance model was to help families so that, within them, dependant persons were attended by women. The help provided through the parishes where the same model for women to take care of poor families should also be taken into account, but this obviously does not appear on printed statistics.

It is very important to remember a process of religious feminization which took place throughout the 19th century. Although it is a feature common to Catholic and Protestant countries, in Spain, as in other Catholic nations, were adopted specific characteristics. The gender model for distinguishing women and men in those
nations was based on identifying men with science and modernity. On the other hand, women would be linked with religion and tradition. The general female model of *Angel of the home* would be defined by Catholic stereotypes like from the Catholic Counter-Reformation and *the strong woman* from the Bible.

This separation of private and public spheres did not prevent women of the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy from having a public space to act (v. gr., charity) and they were the *poor visitors*. This was a role reserved for women of the aristocracy and the high bourgeoisie, while their husbands began (or combined) their local or regional political career as well as belonging to the Boards of Directors of the *semi-public* charity institutions.

The Ladies of Charity very early copied the French example: the Saint Vincent de Paul Society existed in Madrid only 12 years after being set up in France. Although it was suppressed in the *progressive six-year period* (1868-74), this mostly female organization was quickly legalized by the conservatives after 1875. Incidentally, the *Associations Act*, only approved after 1887, recorded a considerable increase in Religious Congregations which were specialized in two aspects: Charity and Education. Pointing out that the importance of these Congregations grew after the difficulties the Religious Orders in France went through after the decrees of J. Ferry and other governments at the beginning of the 20th century is a very well-known topic in Spanish historiography. Therefore women were not only on the supply side for charity, but they also acted as special assistants. This was understood as a prolongation of their domestic responsibilities focused on educating their relatives and on taking care of dependent people (children, the sick, the elderly, etc.) in their families. This aspect was generally considered intensified in Southern Europe’s *familism* model.  

It is assumed that the 1822 General Charities Act was the model for deciding on passing Social Assistance to civilian power following the provisions made in the 1812 Constitution. But that Act gave to *Sisters of Charity* an important role in taking care of paupers. The presence of Catholic nuns in public and private charity institutions would grow throughout that century, especially during the *Catholic Revival* after 1876. The number of Spanish nuns estimated at around 11,000

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women in the middle of the 19th century multiplied by four at the beginning of the 20th century. Nicolás.

Women also had a crucial role from the demand side for charity by dependent families. In the urban world, the poorest working-class women were not only those who were most in contact with parishes and religious associations asking for help. They were also those who went most to the municipal institutions asking for home help (food, clothing, coal, etc.) or they would act by registering in the register of paupers at their neighbourhood authorities to receive free medical aid. Those registers for helping the poor were not widespread in Spain until 1891 when a fear of revolution had the conservative leaders concerned, even though they had been approved in a progressive Health Act in 1855 which was hardly applied until the end of this century. In fact, a few years before 1890, in the midst of social peace, governments had ignored the request to re-publish the 1873 Republican Act which protected children at work, for, according to the authorities, it was not necessary.

It is a well-known fact that when a certain social legislation began to exist (after the 1890 Berlin Congress), special thought once given to the weakest workers (women and children). After that, concern for a high child mortality rate led to new Maternity Houses, Nursery Schools, School Holiday Camps and School Dining-rooms being opened in Spain for poor children within a population concern which was customary in many European countries of that period.

Attending to women must also be understood in a very important sphere in SW: Education. Both the contemporaries and the current historians have stressed that one of the most significant aspects of the 1857 Education Act was an accelerated rise in the female literacy rates in the final decades of the 19th century. In 1882, the author of that Act, C. Moyano, emphasized that educating girls had a basic function: it was not intended for them to dedicate themselves to “literary works”, but to be able to take better care of their families in the future.

The increase in schoolmistresses throughout the 19th century was an exception to the drop in qualifications typical of most female professions. Some schoolmistresses were the ones who understood most the needs of the working-class girls not qualified in public schools: they defended that these girls could join the classes with flexible time-tables to be able to combine their learning and family tasks. The data

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24 Gracia, J., “Pobreza y género en los comienzos de la primera industrialización vasca”, in González Mínguez, C. et al., eds., Marginación y exclusión social en el País Vasco (Bilbao, 2000), 125–149.
available on regular attendance of children at schools are not very reliable and the same happens with the data given in the register of the poor to receive medical care; they show similar shortcomings by concealing a reality that was rather unfavourable for a State which was not so concerned about education as by wanting to make out that it supported literacy as much as possible.

That is why it is not safe to trust statistics which tell us about similar figures between boys and girls regarding their compulsory attendance at school at the end of the 19th century. The press at that time and at the beginning of the 20th century clearly showed that girls attended the municipal schools, designed as “schools for the poor”, less regularly. They also left their schooling earlier because they had to take care of their younger brothers and sisters when their mothers were working, prepare meals for their relatives, take those meals to their parents and brothers, etc.

Apart from education, other institutions (like Savings Banks) were also involved in Charity in Spain during the 19th century (specifically after the 1880 Act). There were obviously very few unqualified workers who could save due to a low level of their salaries. However, in this case, there was one exception: the young women working in domestic service, which, in some cities, were almost half the savers. In fact, at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th, the most vulnerable working classes would go to moneylenders and pawnshops to get money. If what the press of that time saw was true, as the ones responsible for looking after the home, women were those who took charge of these problems. It is clear that this last phenomenon cannot be considered within Social Aid, but quite the contrary: as evidence of an absence not so much of SW but of an inexistence of proper micro-credit institutions. In cities like Saragossa, Bilbao, etc. where there had been important private banks since the middle of the 19th century, there were no municipal Savings Banks –including Pawnbrokers (Montes de Piedad) for the most vulnerable working-class groups– until the end of the 19th century or the beginning of the 20th. Local bankers-interests were more important than those of the poor families.

The importance of women’s role as Welfare providers in the bosom of families was repeated in the case of contacts with shopkeepers who, sometimes charging much higher prices or selling food products that were not in good condition, accepted the payments deferred by vulnerable workers’ wives, and other similar

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28 Carasa, P., “Por una historia social de la ciudad” in Serrallonga, J. et al., La sociedad urbana en la España contemporánea (Barcelona, 1994), 23–64.
practices. The poor people’s traditional methods in their effort to live made up for the lack of SW, and the most vulnerable families had to rely on undesirable help within a tradition of varied, complex and complementary survival strategies carried out by the most needy.

The fact that some of those strategies, like emigration, had a family, and not only an individual, component is something that has been argued in Spanish historiography.31 The tendency of emigrant families from certain areas to occupy nearby houses in certain neighbourhoods was obviously to make up for the same lack of SW, and not only at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, but also in later times.32 Many ways in which the poor women contributed to what has been called family micro-solidarity, compared with social macro-solidarity (typical of WS), involved considerable inequality for them in comparison with men. This fact inevitably belongs to what tends to be called women’s “invisibility” in History, of which there are sometimes references in dubious reliable sources (such as literary sources which, of course, do not represent social reality, but they over-represent it).

Occasionally resorting to the charity provided by the town halls (combining money from them and collections of money promoted by the elite classes to get donations) was not incompatible with turning to other forms of help, such as home help or medical-pharmaceutical aid, at certain stages of the life cycle or the economic situation. The latter sometimes included up to 40% of the total population in some cities at the end of the 19th century, i.e. many of the unqualified working-class families.33 This did not prevent those percentages from being drastically cut after a short number of years for in one or another town council there were other needs that were considered more urgent, or because the political groups that controlled local powers had changed.

There are very many reasons offered by historians to explain the precarious existence of a real Social Reform in Spain. This is not the place to deal with them, and it is even less the moment to point out the regulations, decrees and reforming laws that range from the establishment of the first Industrial Accident Insurance in 1900 (not by chance just after Italy or France, and copying their models) to the very belated Unemployment Insurance in 1961 (only preceded by an special Insurance for Technological Unemployment not many years before).34 In actual fact, that

32 García, R., Historias de emigración: factores de expulsión y selección de capital humano en la emigración a la Ría de Bilbao (1877–1935), (Bilbao, 2004).
34 Castillo, S., ed., Solidaridad, seguridad, bienestar: 100 años de protección social en España (Madrid, 2008); Tortuero, J. L., ed., Cien años de protección social en España (Madrid 2007).
Reform would be no more than a set of laws and regulations (no less than 531 between 1900 and 1910\textsuperscript{35}, that very often were not complied with). This is how it was proclaimed by working-class leaders -or foreign observers who stressed that that was common to southern European countries. \textsuperscript{36}

As was the custom in other countries, social reforms in laws gave special preference to women; they were laws that protected them in their work, as occurred with children and other “fragile subjects”, for they were individuals with absolutely no citizenship. They planned maternal rest at work after the birth (but without being paid any money at the beginning, in 1900), the female shop workers’ right to have a seat to rest, regulation of the maximum working hours for female factory workers or for those sector in which women were a majority (like the textile sector), the prohibition of female night work, etc. These meant there was a conception of gender which saw working-class mothers as ignorant -if not guilty, of the high child mortality rate- who had to be educated in childcare by male health professionals (i.e. doctors) with a pro-natal concern. \textsuperscript{37} After half a century, a health adviser boasted because, from 1900 to 1960, that mortality rate had dropped from figures over 100% to 32%, although, as current historians remember, there had already been doctors who observed at that time that the public water piping and drainage had been just as or more beneficial than the childcare concerns. \textsuperscript{38} Although different political regimes tried to take the merit for improving health policies, it is not surprising that the evolution of Italy and Spain’s figures were very similar, sometimes under very different political conditions, and this was due to the similarity in social and economic conditions which were more important than the specific political measures. \textsuperscript{39}

It cannot be denied that maternity and babyhood aid institutions, which depended on local charity (such as the so-called Gota de Leche) increased their activity; they went from attending to 5% of the child population in 1914 to 25% in 1925. \textsuperscript{40} However, this was still very little. It is not surprising that the “flag-waving” sentiments of an old, ruined empire in decline were appealed to in order to promote a Social Reform, such as when one of the most influent reformist


\textsuperscript{36} Marvaud, A., La question social en Espagne (Paris, 1910).

\textsuperscript{37} Palacio, I., Mujeres ignorantes, madres culpables: adoctrinamiento y divulgación materno-infantil en la primera mitad del siglo XX (Valencia, 2003).


\textsuperscript{40} Rodríguez, E., “Medicina y Acción social en la España del primer tercio del siglo XIX”, in López, C., ed, De la beneficencia al bienestar social (Madrid, 1986), 227–266.
intellectuals (A. Buylla) indicated in 1892 that the Spanish Social Care Service was the worst in Europe, even after Portugal; like when in the nineteen-thirties the progressive politicians of the second Republic stated that, in some aspect, the Spanish social legislation was further behind than in Turkey, which had the same purpose of stirring patriotic consciences. It was a case of looking towards Europe in a rather naïve manner the way the so-called regenerationists (very often in favour of a Social State) had done in search of modernization after the end of the final remains of the Old empire in 1898.

Some authors have made an effort to point out that the conservative social Catholics were very important in these social reforms. For them, the state regulation would be a convergent strategy with those carried out by religious charity through Christian Revival institutions where women had a predominant role. The reality was that both the conservatives and the left-wing reformists were thinking of models from Central Europe (like Germany), although very different ones. The difference regarding Germany, Belgium, etc. was that the Spanish social Catholicism did not create real strong Christian unions (except for some regional cases), but paternalistic organizations depending on the elite classes’ charity.

In these Christian organizations, women had an essential role, unlike in the socialist or anarchist unions where it was clear that the idea of respectability of working-class families was that women should not work for low salaries, in such a way that they “took away” jobs of work from their husbands, sons or brothers. The Christian female unions were very strong in Spanish cities due to the paternalistic help they provided, apart from other reasons already explained. Here we cannot go into details on the activities of these unions which defended the Catholic family model through free Sunday schools for servants or other female workers, mutual aid societies, school dining-rooms and nursery schools, etc.

In the rural world of a large part of the north of Spain where there was a majority of owners of small farms, the Christian unions had a masculine component due to a strong presence of traditional religion which was not restricted to women, as opposed to in the cities. These Christian unions were not after a Social State, but a modernized form of charity. But neither were the powerful anarchist unions looking for it, nor were the Marxist groups wanting Social Reform, but they were after a socialist State (except for reformist minorities of Spanish socialism), which was very

different. So, few political powers were really interested in it in a radicalized Spain until 1939.

Many of the female voluntary Mutual Aid Societies (often not very “voluntary”, for they were subsidized by paternalistic businessmen who obliged their female workers to join these societies) were Catholic. Since women were unable to finance SW for themselves due to their low salaries, it is also understood that often circumstances like the impossibility of working due to pregnancy, birth-giving or “typical women’s illnesses” were not covered by that insurance. In many male Mutual Aid Societies, women were admitted as beneficiaries, but only as relatives of the “bread-winning” regular members (just as in the case of other family members like children, etc.), or when they were single or widows.\(^\text{43}\) This was all a result of the fact that, according to gender stereotypes, working-class women’s place was in their home, looking after their families, moralizing them, but, naturally they had to stay away from the factories.

Most “social” laws were approved, above all, by conservative governments (i.e., close to the Catholic Revival). This was coherent with a certain organic and communitarian sense of society by the conservative politicians which was not shared by the Liberal Party. However, those organicist principles were also defended by a radical reformist left wing which was very influential in certain intellectual circles (the so-called Krausists)\(^\text{44}\). The Liberal Party defended absolute individualism. It fostered educational reforms for the working classes to be able to overcome poverty, but it did not promote activities that meant a more active participation in economic activities of a protective state. However, there was no risk of excesses in this sense in the Spain of that time. In any case, these last aspects correspond to the political and Intellectual history of Welfare in Spain and not to Social history, so we shall not be dealing with them more here, for they are also well-known from an old historiography.

There are multiple reasons for explaining the prolonged absence of a Social State, and its complete explanation has completely nothing to do with this text. However, it cannot be forgotten that the inappropriate reforms of the State Treasury since 1845 avoided, among other issues, Income Tax. On the other hand, indirect taxes were chosen and they continued to be collected in town councils until a late stage. It is not surprising that the Public Social Expenditure between 1850 and 1960 was estimated at never exceeding 1% of the GDP.\(^\text{45}\) It was consistent with the fact that

\(^{43}\) Castillo, S., ed., Solidaridad desde abajo (Madrid, 1994).

\(^{44}\) The influence of a German philosopher, K. Krause, on Spain through left-wing intellectuals with an influence on education and other fields is a subject that has been deeply studied by historians, but it cannot be examined in these pages.

the Public Expenditure percentage within the GDP was only 9.7% in 1901, and the worst thing was that, in 1952, it was still around 8.7%. A WS could not exist while a modern tax state did not exist.

From Fragmentary Social Insurances to a “Social State” under the Franco’s Regime

There is no consensus among historians on the development of SW in the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930). Even though its corporatism was far from fascism, it is mentioned that it may have been an example of social protection “through other means”, or a type of (frustrated) attempt at “passive consent” to control the population, following the well-know described model for fascist Italy. In practice, it meant maintaining the old local charity and intra-family solidarity, even in spite of the cooperation with the reformist socialists, of a Work Code, of a certain improvement in education, of the creation of the Childcare School or the Health School, etc. There can be no doubt about the fact that the elite medical class (opposed to any Compulsory Sickness Insurance) was very strong during that dictatorship. If in 1924 a famous expert on social affairs forecasted that the Charity Organization would soon be coming to an end (according to his thoughts, when Compulsory Sickness Insurance was created), this would not happen in Spain until 1942. In fact, the attempts of a certain left-wing monarchist politicians -such J. Chapaprieta’s which ultimately entailed the introduction of an Income Tax– were forgotten.

The 1925 figures spoke volumes about it: in a country with 25 million inhabitants, only about four hundred thousand had social insurance. The main organization that promoted Reforms [Instituto de Reformas Sociales (IRS), i.e. Social Reform Institute] was eliminated and there were thoughts of abolishing Instituto Nacional de Previsión (INP), i.e. National Welfare Institute. In an irregular fashion, money funds reserved for protecting old age (due to the Compulsory Retirement) were illegally transferred to promote education. In 1923 the Charity Statistics showed the following:

47 Rodríguez, E., Salud pública en España: ciencia, profesión y política (siglos XVIII–XX) (Granada, 2005).
Table 2. Spanish Welfare institutions 1923.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charity institutions</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Governments</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Authorities</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, the central State Charity organizations were led by the Catholic ladies who defended what was sometimes called organized feminism, which meant that the working-class women were to take care of the family micro-solidarity. Any attempt by the monarchist democratic left wing to introduce the Maternity Insurance, already planned in 1923, was stopped. It was enacted in 1929, but only rhetorically, with no practical effects.

That last Compulsory Insurance was not put into effect until 1931, under a second progressive Republic and with the Socialist Party dominating the Ministry of Labour. This delay was not by chance: when the insurance was put into effect by the progressive Republic, the forecast of 140,000 beneficiary mothers was proved to be wrong, because 390,520 women were attended to. Since the II Republic in power (1931-1936) had many other problems, it could not focus its efforts on carrying out a Social Reform.\footnote{51 Mazuecos, A.: “La política social socialista durante el primer bienio republicano: trabajo, previsión y sanidad”, 
Estudios de Historia Social, 14 (1980),135–155.} One thing did happen: the increase in public education was boosted with a very large Social Expenditure. The paternalistic forms of Catholic aid for the poor were underestimated in a strongly anti-clerical context.

As a Chancellor of the Exchequer (M. Ruiz-Funes) confessed in the midst of a depression in the thirties, the lack of State revenue prevented an Unemployment Insurance from being introduced, but guarantees for forgotten rural sectors were extended, a social legislation on industrial accidents was improved, etc., and a Compulsory Sickness Insurance plan was drawn up, even though the doctors were clearly against it. The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) stopped the plan from being carried out when it was about to be discussed in Parliament, although some versions -according to comments made by a Franco’s Minister of Labour, J. A. Girón- assume that the subsequent dictatorship took that project out of an office drawer to put it into effect.\footnote{52 Molinero, C., La captación de las masas: política social y propaganda en el régimen franquista (Madrid, 2005).}

From an Inefficient Corporate Social State to the First Development of Social Security (1937–1975)
General Franco himself was the one who soon classified his regime as a *Social State* (1940) in the first years of his dictatorship, when imitating the victorious European fascisms of WW II was most accentuated. Between 1937 and 1944, it was rhetorically said, within a modern action for coercively persuading the masses, copied from European totalitarianism, that the “old bourgeois charity” made no sense in the face of a pretended *national-syndicalist* “Social Justice”. 53

The “hybrid” nature of Franco’s regime, in which several anti-revolutionary groups (Catholics, fascists, the military, conservatives, monarchists, business sectors, etc.) joined forces, had a big influence on the chaos and lack of coordination typical of the *SW* in the Franco’s state. As an example of a complete lack of planning, it can be noted that, when Franco died, there were up to over 7 Ministries in charge of Health (often with ideologically opposing views).

There has been evidence that in the face of the traditional gender models, an attempt was made to establish rhetorical models in the discourse of a new “social woman” (and of *SW*). These would be the models defended by the creators of the *Winter Aid* (which later became *Auxilio Social*, i.e *Social Aid*), influenced by the Nazi example of *Winterhilfe*, or those of the women in the Female Section of Franco’s Single-Party (*FET*). However, those models failed faced with the traditional stereotypes of the Christian woman and charity (defended by the Catholics who headed the Ministry of Education, the traditionalists of the Ministry of Justice or the conservative military of the Home Office, etc.). The ministries headed by conservative politicians, monarchists and the military, also supported by some doctors who opposed the interventionist Social State, did not want to go one millimetre beyond social Catholicism.

The creation of some kind of Compulsory Insurance (the *Old Age Insurance* (1939), the *Compulsory Sickness Insurance* (*SOE*) (1942), the *Old Age and Disablement Insurance* (*SOVI*) (1947), etc. and laws like the *Health Act* (1944) were the result of a pretended “new Social State”. This was defined in the first of the *Fundamental Laws* of Franco’s regime which made up the dictatorship’s pseudo-constitutional framework: the *Fundamental Labour Law* (1938). This was based on the fascist nationalism-syndicalism, although it also depended on the Catholic principles. This law expressly stated that its objective was “to free women from the factories and workshops” (sic). In the face of innovating woman models proposed in the previous progressive second Republic, it was an attempt to make women, as mothers and wives, take care of the children, the elderly and the sick in their homes. There was no need for any Welfare State, although this was, in fact, the opposite of

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the totalitarian Warfare State: the families continued to be the ones who took charge of a large number of social obligations.\footnote{Guillén, A. M., \textit{Políticas de reforma sanitaria en España: de la restauración a la democracia} (Madrid, 1996).}

The two main political sectors of the dictatorship (the fascists and the Catholic nationals) struggled in an attempt to control women within that Welfare. In the face of Social Aid, soon placed under the Home Office, led by men, diminishing its fascist bias\footnote{Cenarro, A., \textit{La sonrisa de la Falange: auxilio social en la guerra civil y en la posguerra} (Barcelona, 2005); Ibídem, \textit{Los niños de Auxilio Social} (Madrid, 2009).}, the Female Section of the FET (placed within the Party’s Ministry), led by women, presented a power that became more persistent in time. Above all, their concern was childcare, the reduction of the high child mortality rate through spreading knowledge of Maternity in the rural world (with Home Schools for future mothers), etc., or Homes for working mothers, Nursery Schools, the so called Female Social Service -compulsory for women, just as Military Service was for men.\footnote{Bernabéu, J., “Madres y enfermeras. Demografía y salud en la política poblacionista del primer franquismo, 1939–1950”, \textit{Revista de Demografía Histórica}, 20 (1) (2002), 123–144; Ibídem et al., “Niveles de vida y salud en la España del primer franquismo: las desigualdades en la mortalidad infantil”, \textit{Revista de Demografía Histórica}, 24 (1) (2006), 181–202.} It was a matter of reducing the 100,000 children who died officially every year in the forties by following what were the three social objectives proclaimed by Franco: childcare, to eliminate tuberculosis and to solve housing problems.

Many of these problems were the consequence of an economy destroyed in a civil war and of isolation thanks to the democratic countries since Nazi Germany was defeated, in such a way that, until 1950, the industrial production rates and the per capita income of 1930 were not recovered. Diseases that were almost extinct in the thirties persisted until 1957. So, there was a failure with regards to disease in spite of the Compulsory Sickness Insurance. This had nothing to do with a Social State approach designed as a right for the citizens, which was inexisten during Franco’s Regime, and contrary to the WS model made based on the well-know reports of W. Beveridge (1942–1944) and theories of T. H. Marshall in 1950. A Compulsory Sickness Insurance emerged only to help economically weak workers (scarcely one third of the population in the forties). The doctors’ interests, defended by the Catholic military groups that controlled the General Management of Health in the Home Office, managed to make its impact restricted. The medical class was not jeopardised. To the contrary, around 1960, two thirds of the general practitioners were included in the CSI and enjoyed the increased income which combining their activity in private and public healthcare activity provided them.
The re-Christianizing nature of the Regime, restored by F. Franco in the forties, was shown in many aspects. Priests were on the Charity Boards again, and although it took some time for a new Concordat to be signed with the Church (from 1941 to 1953), the re-Christianizing rhythm of education were overwhelming. Since the channelling of American Aid through Caritas in 1951, help for families by the Catholic world was strengthened. Caritas was formed in 1942 by the union of the old S. V. de Paul and Catholic Action Conferences; it was a group with a strong female component and it was composed of 500,000 visitors of the poor (providing food and clothing, but also education). The Catholic organizations’ great ability for becoming modern guaranteed the persistence of Catholic institutions in SW up to the present day. After the eighties and until today, Caritas faced the challenges of the new poverty and social exclusion by forming part of the so-called Third Sector, Voluntary Services or NGOs.

The Franco regime’s inheritance in the social panorama was rather unfortunate. In 1960, the Compulsory Sickness Insurance hardly attended to 50% of the population. In that year, only 4.1% of the hospital beds were included in this insurance (compared to 30.3% which depended on the town councils or 33.2% on private institutions). The archaic Department of Charity Organizations was maintained in 1976 as an example of a rather old-fashioned model. In 1975 the money transfers from the Spanish State to the Social Security were 0.4% compared to the 12.1% in the OECD. The percentage of the social expenditure in the GDP in 1975 was 12% in Spain (compared with 20.1% in the OECD). In that same year in Spain, the Public Expenditure was 24.7% of the GDP (and 40.2% in the OECD countries).

As stated, without a modern tax system, it was impossible to maintain a modern Social State. In its absence, an economy characterized by a low female employment rate was the fundamental welfare supplier for families during the Franco’s dictatorship.

It cannot be denied that there was a progress in the Franco’s regime about Social Policy, even before the sixties. A medicalisation policy, which is currently being discussed, was developed. So, births aided by doctors were: 57

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The possible effects of the influence of the promoting Social Aid and Female Section educational campaigns on the rural world cannot be discarded, although their

effects must not be exaggerated, blown up by the dictatorship’s propaganda. But
the chaos and lack of coordination introduced in the health framework by Compulsory Mutual Aid Societies controlled by National-Syndicalist Organization or Special Regimes of Social Security (somehow following the old trade unionism) were a heavy inheritance for Spain after 1975.

The fact that the Social Security Act signed in 1963 was not put into effect until 1967 and was reformed in 1972 (Ley de Perfeccionamiento/Perfecting Act) was a sign of the health care dysfunctionality of an economy that was growing rapidly (at an annual rate of 7% in the sixties, i.e. the second highest in the western world after Japan). The Social Security grew, for its liquid assets went from being 58% of the State budgets in 1967 to 98% in 1974. However, this development was anarchic and rather inefficient.

There were advances in certain sectors, for example, a Social Housing Policy which had advanced little under the liberal legislation after 1911. This was one of the objectives of the propaganda policy of the fascist trade unions. In 1952 they calculated that there was a lack of 700,000 houses in Spain, but their capacity to provide a solution was limited (24,000 houses between 1942 and 1954 and, allegedly, 73,814 in 1955 and 1956). But it would be senseless to confuse WS with populisms like the Housing Policy implemented by a fascist politician (J. A. Girón).

From the Origin of a Welfare State to the Present (1976–2004)

The development of WS and the importance of women and families’ contribution to overcome their shortages in Spain has been the object not only of studies by historians but, above all, by sociologists and economists.  

In these studies, regardless of the fact that the data may vary slightly, it is clear that there is a series of indisputable aspects. So, Spain’s agreement with the more developed Europe, after the dictator’s death, was made between 1976 and 1985, especially by governments from the political centre and not so much by the Social-

ist Party. In this way 3.6 million people receiving pensions in 1976 went up to 5.4 million in 1985. The following figures are significant: 59

Table 4. Percentage of Spanish social services within the GDP (1985–1998).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This was in a period of economic recession, which caused a public deficit. Although there was a significant tax reform, the extent of black economies in Spain was very high. For instance, 1.5 million new tax payers appeared in only one year (1986–1987), but estimates on the economy not recorded in the national accounts data referred to figures of around 20% of the GDP.

The convergence of the data relating to the amount of Social Expenditure in the GDP of the EU15 occurred especially since a general strike from 1988 to 1993. Then, under the conservative governments, the Social Expenditure percentage was reduced (and, obviously, also the Public Expenditure percentage) with respect to the GDP. 60


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU15</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evolution of the nineties in the 20th century experienced a reduction in the public deficit in an accelerated attempt to fulfil the forecasts to be able to enter the single currency at any price.

Not all of this should be considered as “anti-social”, because the 14% unemployment rate, which had not dropped since the eighties (stated as reaching 22% in 1993) began to fall, especially in the first years of this 21st century. The creation of employment and wealth under neo-liberal politics in the nineties did not, however, remedy the fact that there was a low employment rate for women between 15 and 64 years old (no doubt “ideal” for looking after the families), which was then the

lowest of the EU15. Neither did it solve the very low percentage of the child population under 3 years old being attended at nursery schools (according to what was said, there were less than in Greece and Portugal, imitating old stereotypes inherited from the past) and a small part of the elderly population being attended at Old People’s Homes. Maintaining this was possible thanks to an existence of the so-called “grandma-mums” who took care of their grandchildren until they were 3 years of age, and to an increase in nuclear families (in which the elderly parents were attended to by one of their children’s family, preferably daughters). In coherence with this, other social expenditures not extensively dealt with here (such as education expenses) continued to be low. This is how they were in 2002: 


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage of GDP in 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusions

The growth of the WS in Spain since 1976 is undeniable. The weight of previous inheritances (including the 40 years that passed between 1936 and 1975, but not only them) explains a care model which the importance of families and women as suppliers of well-being cannot be denied. Here, no mention has been made of changes in the Spanish demography, signs of which were especially shown between 1996 and 2007 due to a strong immigration (including women occupied taking care of children and elderly people in the homes), especially from Africa and Latin America, which caused and changing panorama. In the beginning of 2008 we are faced with a more uncertain future than ever, if possible, which prevents forecasts from being made which, as is well known, are not reached to a large extent and, in any case, are far from the historians’ competence.

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