Comparing Cultures of Citizenship and Changing Concepts of Nation and Community in the EU and USA

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This paper examines whether museums and cultural institutions meet or challenge increasing calls by Western/European neoliberal governments (and some communities) to become sites of social action, innovation and entrepreneurship. I begin by exploring the relationship between multiculturalism, social cohesion and museums in Britain, which I then compare with an examination of Native rights and sovereignty in the contemporary post-colonial North American context. My overarching aim in bringing case studies from the EU (Britain) and USA together is to examine how and why the terms ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ have been centralized by projects of self-determination for Native Americans, and yet also employed as tools central to the promotion of national government interests in the US and EU countries. With an interest in drawing attention to the politics of culture and museums, and in light of ongoing challenges to traditional concepts of citizenship and the authority associated with ‘nation’, the purpose of this paper is to examine if museums contribute to changes in the way citizenship is understood and defined.
Introduction
Any pairing of museums with democracy requires a consideration of the changing concept of citizenship. Citizenship is traditionally understood as representing the public face of individuals’ membership of a political community, and as referring to a legal-formal contract between an individual and the state where, in exchange for being socially and morally responsible, individuals are granted rights to political agency that include having the right to vote and stand for office, and access to legal support. Formalistic conceptions of citizenship like this have provided the basis for most Western liberal democratic constitutions, and support the model of citizenship as consisting of political, civil and social rights, as put forward by British sociologist, T.H. Marshall (1950, p. 11). Each of these dimensions of citizenship is supported by an institutional apparatus: the juridical system as regards civil rights, education as regards the social, and the electoral system and political parties as regards the political (Yudice 2005, p. 164). Despite contemporary recognition of the ways in which citizenship has been a core component of national cultural homogenization (Campaign Against Racism and Fascism 2002), the Marshallian paradigm dominant throughout the post-war period relegated culture to the everyday and private or domestic sphere and in effect excluded it, as such, from discourses on citizenship.

In the last two decades, however, the liberal tradition of rights—where citizenship aspires to be unitary and universalist, and thus seeks to convey representation and participation rights to all individuals within a polity on an equal basis—has been significantly influenced by ideas of universal and cosmopolitan human rights and the implications of globalization (cultural and social pluralism and fragmentation) on the territorial, sovereign state. The singular notion of citizenship has been pluralized and pushed aside by theorists including Renato Rosaldo (1994), Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (1994), Aihwa Ong (1996), Marion Young (2000), Toby Miller (2001), Gerard Delanty (2003), Nick Stevenson (2006), Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner (2007), whose work has led to recognition that citizenship may be understood more broadly than as referring to the relations between individuals and political institutions, and that it can in fact be realized through everyday experience and cultural practice itself. Indeed, discussions about citizenship often rely on the potential of culture to redefine the term, and frequently put forth the argument that a cultural collective may be a site of political membership and legitimacy. This cultural turn has shifted the focus of citizenship from civic to political and social rights, and has led to renewed attention to culture (represented as identity, gender, sexuality and race), values and habits as potentially unifying and motivating, as well as an interest in the ways that the contested norms of conduct and citizenship are influenced by power relations. The shift has also combined with claims made by supporters of global democracy and cultural pluralism (Young 2000), who contend that citizenship does not need to be articulated through the nation-state to be meaningful, but that it can be exercised in a multiplicity of sites, located at different levels of governance. This move designates a shift toward decision-making processes at the social or community level that involve, ideally, a large number and range of diverse actors, not only governmental, but also from the private and non-profit sectors. Governance also incorporates the new demands of citizens and groups to be involved in decisions that affect them so that the new focus on cultures of citizenship can function as an extension of claims by minority groups for greater direct political representation, or sovereignty.

This paper picks up a point raised by Dominique Leydet (2006, p. 25) to ask: ‘how robust an identity can citizenship provide in complex and internally diverse societies?’ I examine whether museums and cultural activities meet or challenge increasing calls by Western/European neoliberal governments (and some communities) to become sites of social action, innovation and entrepreneurship, and ask whether active state policy-making processes
can regenerate the terms of social democracy through rebuilding an engaged civil society that has the resources and capacity to tackle tough issues including economic regeneration, conflict between civic groups, and even neighbourhood safety. I examine the role that culture is perceived to play in growing this potential at grass-roots level. The paper begins with an expanded discussion of the relationships between culture, identity and citizenship. It then moves to compare the concept of cultural citizenship as it has been evoked in relation to and by Native American cultures in the USA with the formalized concept of European identity that has been promoted by the European Union in the same period. The comparison provides a framework to examine the role that museums and culture play in creating these concepts, and enables investigation into how museums can contribute to changes in the way citizenship is understood and defined. The first section of the paper analyses the relationship between multiculturalism, social cohesion and cultural activities in Britain, and my principle case study is Liverpool’s successful bid for the title of Capital of Culture 2008. In the second section, I examine Native rights and claims for sovereignty in the contemporary post-colonial North American context, and present the National Museum of the American Indian in Washington DC as my main case study. Germane to these examples is the suggestion that ‘changing sociocultural realities underscore the limitations of strictly legal-formal notions of citizenship; not least, for example, in the face of the social problematics in post-colonial multicultural societies’ (Hermes and Dahlgren 2006, p. 259). We can see this reflected in Britain, where practices of citizenship have come under scrutiny and re-assessment as a consequence of 9/11, the 7 July 2005 bombings in London and other threats to security, including the 2001 urban disorders that spread across northern England (Home Office 2001, Burnett 2007, p. 354). In the USA, the community-based activism, civil rights movements and politics of difference that emerged throughout the 1970s combined to challenge the unilateral decisions made by the colonial American state as well as dominant ideas about citizenship.

My overarching aim in bringing case studies from Britain and the USA together is to examine how and why the terms ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ have been centralized by projects of self-determination for Native Americans (many of whom have never been fully included in citizenship regimes), and yet also employed as tools central to the promotion of national government and supranational interests in the US and in EU countries. I argue that while access to and participation in cultural activities or traditions may be represented as secondary to political participation, typically as ‘symbolic restitution for the injustices of the colonial era in lieu of more concrete forms of social, economic and political redress’ (Phillips 2004, p. 22), debates on the politics of difference and the politics of entitlement have increasingly been staged according to the language of cultural rights. Add to this the role of cultural policy, as a goal-oriented zone of social governance that contributes to the construction of citizen identities, and it becomes evident that any ideological or historical distinction between culture and politics is unsustainable. With an interest in drawing attention to the politics of culture and museums, and in light of ongoing challenges to traditional concepts of citizenship and the authority associated with ‘nation’, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether cultural activities and museums contribute to changes in the way citizenship is understood and defined.

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1 As well as being a ‘postcolonial’ nation, the USA is also multicultural, and Kymlicka and Norman’s three categories of rights exist there as much as they do in the EU. For the comparative purposes of this paper, however, I am going to focus on the relationships between self-government rights and culture in the US and multicultural rights and culture in the EU. Similarly, there has been much debate concerning the implications of changing concepts of citizenship on the civil and social rights of migrants, refugees and ‘state-less’ peoples in both contexts (usually in regard to Kymlicka and Norman’s categories of special rights and multicultural rights). These have often been discussed in relation to the emergence of universal human rights regimes that focus on crimes against humanity, and attention to the recognition of refugee, immigrant and asylum status (Benhabib 2007). Attention to these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
defined. I am interested in whether museums can, by working with communities to expand their representation of the practice and experience of citizenship, challenge the instrumentalization of the term. As such, my examination is concerned with ways that citizens actively engage in governance and participate in democracy, rather than with what Delanty (2007b) calls ‘disciplinary citizenship’ (as the processes by which they learn to behave in certain ways). This means that my emphasis is more on theory and conceptualization, and on ideas about the possibility of achieving ‘everyday democracy’—which can refer to how ‘users can take the lead in redesigning public services like health and social care, to explaining the role that local communities need to play in combating Europe’s terrorist threat, to helping the residents of the city of Glasgow imagine a different future for their city in 2020’ (Skidmore and Bound 2008, p. 25)—rather than on empirical measurement or connections between citizenship education and museums (Message 2008, Message 2002; See also Belfiore 2002, MLA nd, MLA 2005, MLA South West 2008). If the new museology is to be believed, and museums do have this potential (Peers and Brown 2003, Kreps 2003, Newman, McLean and Urquhart 2005, Message 2006), does the agency created by the challenge rely on exercising (or legitimating) the new discourses of cultural citizenship? If so, is it also possible that new museums aspire to develop what Joke Hermes and Peter Dahlgren (2006, p. 261) call ‘a more widely shared and more widely available form of “the political” as moments of engagement, of “public connection”’?

Culture, Identity and Citizenship

Cultural citizenship and European identity are both concepts that have gained popularity as ways to explain how contemporary interests in culture, identity, and citizenship have been brought together. Both concepts promote the construction of more democratic institutions that develop more directly dialogical relationships with their constituents. Both emerged out of the recognition of identity politics and civil rights movements of the 1960s onward, but have firmer origins in the moments of public and governmental optimism and connection to politics that led to the wave of democracy which spread globally throughout 1989, and with the increasing institutional interest in reconnecting with constituent communities that followed on from this period. The events and institutions I discuss in this essay are the direct result of ideas that crystallized at this time, when professional museological and other institutional interest, government confidence, and public optimism came together to heighten links between culture and citizenship. It is notable, for instance, that the European Capital of Culture programme followed on from the European Cities of Culture programme, which was launched in 1985 as a way of bringing citizens of the European Community closer together. The connections are also apparent in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which led to the creation of the European Union. This period was also important in the United States for acknowledging calls by Native communities for greater recognition of their claims for sovereignty over cultural patrimony. In 1990, for instance, the Indian Arts and Crafts Act and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) were both enacted. The National Museum of the American Indian was established by an act of Congress in 1989, and the institution’s central planning document, The Way of the People, was written soon after (Smithsonian Institution Office of Design and Construction 1991). The federally recognized Tribes List Act came into force in 1994. Karen Coody Cooper (2006, p. 9) has suggested that this suite of legislation led to a surge in cultural confidence that was manifested in the development of around 40 tribal museums and cultural centers throughout the following decade.

Although the concepts of cultural citizenship and European identity are both based on ideas of culture and shared identity, there are differences between the projects. Defined as the right to cultural difference and to participate in democracy, cultural citizenship seeks to
provide a set of conceptual and communicative tools to frame interactions between individuals and between individuals and institutions. It often results from bottom-up or community-based activism, and advocates for the recognition of multicultural and/or self-governance rights (Kymlicka and Norman 1994), as I will discuss in relation to the National Museum of the America Indian in the second half of the paper. In contrast, the call for the creation of a European identity is a top-down initiative that was formalized by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Unlike cultural citizenship, European identity has a greater allegiance to the traditional, liberal concept of citizenship as described by Marshall, in that it aims to be unitary and universalist, is comprised principally of political and civil rights in the public sphere, and is intended to contribute to an overarching conception of social integration and cooperation and cohesion throughout the political union. Having said this, however, culture does play a greater role in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty than in Marshall’s conceptualization. The connections between citizenship and culture are demonstrated in Article F of the Maastricht Treaty, which asserts: ‘A state which applies for membership must therefore satisfy the three basic conditions of European identity, democratic status, and respect of human rights’. The Maastricht Treaty represents culture both as a means of constructing and maintaining identity, and as creating a space for the enactment of an expanded notion of ‘European’ citizenship that appears to both, or by turn, combine and refuse the national identities of member states under an overarching cosmopolitan superstate. The approach and rhetorical language used by the European Union has attracted criticism on the basis that it results in uncertainty (if not contradiction) in the way official European Union discourses represent culture because Europe is conceived as a unified and singular cultural entity on the one hand, while on the other, Europe is conceived as a space of diversity, an amalgamation of many cultures, and by implication, of many peoples and interests (Shore 2006, p. 7).

Despite its interest in connecting citizens with the idea of a collective European culture and participatory democracy, the European integration project has been plagued by problems in developing a common vision and citizen-like bonds between the EU and individuals. Europeans are less likely to vote, join political parties, or trust elected representatives than 30 years ago (Skidmore and Bound 2008, p. 17), and although Article A of the Maastricht Treaty claims to mark ‘a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen’ (and despite the trend toward devolution on national fronts throughout the EU), there have been problems in translating this rhetoric to reality. ‘As a public relations exercise, European citizenship has been a dismal failure’, states one commentator (Bauböck 2006, p. 1), who then goes on to argue that ‘most citizens in Europe are not eager to become citizens of Europe and regard with suspicion any demand to shift their political allegiance and identities from the national to the supranational level’. As a result of concern about the widespread lack of public engagement in the EU, very significant financial resources have been committed to formal programmes that include the Europe for Citizens Programme 2007-2013, the 2006-7 round of European Citizens’ Consultations, and the ongoing European Capital of Culture projects. These projects are metonyms for the EU and seek to identify and animate a space between cultural fragmentation and national assimilation that will bring individuals into conversation with the EU by reconnecting representative politics and the informal sphere of people’s everyday lives so that the two support and sustain each other (Skidmore and Bound 2008, pp. 23-4).

This focus on community connections indicates how important the elements of conversation and dialogue are for the creation of a public sphere, which is itself seen as an important precondition for the development of European integration. According to Craig Calhoun (2004, p. 1), a non-spatial communicative public sphere enables:

- participation in collective choice, whether about specific policy issues or basic institutions.
- Second, public communication allows for the production, reproduction or transformation of a
‘social imaginary’ that gives cultural form to integration, making Europe real and giving it shape by imagining it in specific ways. Third, the public sphere is itself a medium of social integration, a form of social solidarity, as well as an arena for debating others.

A key element of this space of dialogue is that it encourages culture and identities to be ‘made and remade in public life’ (Calhoun 2004, p. 1). Its functions reflect the capacity that many museums and cultural institutions have in regard to providing intermediary, dialogic spaces that aim to connect places, people, activities, technologies, and clusters of cultural meaning, have a role in building social integration, and in so doing, enhance communication between individuals and political institutions. Following on from this context, the European Capital of Culture programme can be understood as initiating a range of community-based cultural activities and regeneration projects that replicate the strategies employed by grassroots, community-run cultural centers and tribal museums in the USA, including, importantly, the National Museum of the American Indian. The appropriation of strategies from community-based projects may indicate an acknowledgement by the EU that for European identity (and institutions) to be effective they must actually align with individual and personal expressions and understandings of belonging—that are more usually associated with cultural citizenship, as a concept which grows out of local interests and concerns as articulated by community members. In light of this, European identity may be more accurately represented as an outcome or effect of greater communication between the provincial regions and the Union, which acts more as an overarching umbrella concept that is detached from the everyday life of its citizens, than as a pluralist federation of member states which retain discrete national identities.

Global Comparisons

I want to start my comparison of cultural citizenship in the USA and the European identity project—and the subsequent, interrelated consideration of the role that museums and culture play in creating these concepts—by invoking Isin and Turner’s suggestion (2007, p. 6) that the first step of any attempt to investigate citizenship ‘inevitably involves the comparative study of the rights and duties of citizens across diverse states.’ As such, my discussion focuses on distinctions in the attitudes and approaches to social change taken by the EU in comparison with the US as a settler society, and I argue that these differences emerge, at least in part, from historical differences in the approaches that each have taken to ideas of citizenship. Although citizenship has been widely theorized across a variety of national (and post-national) contexts, Kymlicka and Norman’s (1994, p. 372) identification of three types of demands goes some way toward accounting for the different approaches taken by the EU and US in relation to citizenship. Their three categories include special representation rights (for disadvantaged groups), multicultural rights (for immigrant and religious groups) and self-government rights (for national minorities). The first two are demands for inclusion into mainstream society and concur with Rosaldo’s (1994, p. 57) argument that cultural citizenship emphasizes difference and cultural practice and aims to protect the right to be different (in terms of race, ethnicity, or native language) with respect to the norms of the dominant national community without compromising one’s right to belong to the larger political community (in the sense of participating in the nation-state’s democratic processes). This does, of course, mirror the multicultural ideal which has motivated the establishment of many social and cultural policy initiatives and programmes in the EU and UK that seek to legitimize cultural difference by integrating it within the mainstream. However, as Ong (1996, p. 738) points out in relation to Rosaldo, this concept of cultural citizenship risks subscribing to the very liberal principle of universal equality that it appears to call into question. Kymlicka and Norman (1994, p. 375) explain that claims to self-government rights are grounded in a principle of self-determination that potentially endangers civic integration since—unlike the
other two types—these claims do not aim to achieve a greater presence in the institutions of the central government, but work to gain a greater share of power and legislative jurisdiction for institutions controlled by indigenous peoples and national minorities. Kymlicka and Norman (1994, p. 372) explain that:

These groups are ‘cultures’, ‘peoples’, or ‘nations’ in the sense of being historical communities, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given homeland or territory, sharing a distinct language and history. These nations find themselves within the boundaries of a larger political community, but claim the right to govern themselves in certain key matters, in order to ensure the full and free development of their culture and the best interests of their people. What these national minorities want is not primarily better representation in the central government but, rather, the transfer of power and legislative jurisdictions from the central government to their own communities.

Looked at broadly, the American tradition of citizenship has tended to stress individual responsibility for welfare, a reliance upon voluntary organizations and community-based initiatives rather than state agencies to address social problems, and an abiding suspicion of central institutions of the state. In contrast, the European tradition has emerged out of a Keynesian framework to be more concerned with ideas of social justice that equate to rights and participation, or access to privileges in return for obligations. (For comparative discussion on Britain and USA as characterized by a 1993 ‘Committee of Experts Report on EU Information and Communication Policy’, which draws explicit parallels with the nation-building strategies of the United States, see de Clercq 1993, p. 3). Adding to the existing bank of international agencies, agreements and organizations (like UNESCO, the WTO, etc), formation of new political communities such as the EU have enabled innovative ways of regulating the relations between states, markets and nations. The establishment of the EU has led to questions about how citizenship rights and characteristics should be defined at the overarching European level, and discussion about whether traditional concepts of citizenship might simply be transferred from nation-states to the polity of the EU, or whether new models of a cosmopolitan or ‘global’ citizenry need be developed. Rejecting the possibility of a simple transfer of national rights to an international context, Nikolas Rose (2000b, p. 1401) argues that the creation of the EU means that ‘the question now is not one of national character but of the way in which multiple identities receive equal recognition in a single constitutional form’. Ultimately, European citizenship and identity need be understood as complex and multilayered concepts made up of a variety of newly created tiers of government. Reiterating this point, Elizabeth Meehan (1993, p. 1) explains that a new kind of citizenship is emerging that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but that is multiple in the sense that the identities, rights and obligation associated … with citizenship, are expressed through an increasingly complex configuration of common Community institutions, states, national and transnational voluntary associations, regions and alliances of regions.

In contrast to this attempt to remove or subsume ‘nation’, in the US we can identify attempts to multiply the concept of nation that are guided in large part by demands for the recognition of self-government rights. Evident there is the attempt to legitimize the local as national and thereby raise many Native nations and tribal communities to the status of equivalent sovereign state. The relationship between local community identity and (national) independence is clearly demonstrated in the current process for federal recognition, which requires the petitioning tribe to satisfy seven mandatory criteria, in cluding historical and continuous Native American identity in a distinct community that is defined geographically (http://www.ncai.org/). Federal recognition is important for tribes because it formally establishes a government-to-government relationship, where the US Constitution recognizes that Native American tribes are independent governmental entities (Sissons 2005, pp. 124-5)
that (like foreign governments and state governments within the US) have inherent power to govern their people and their lands. While most citizens of federally recognized tribes will also identify as citizens of the United States, they exert their indigenous citizenship to seek recognition as distinct ‘peoples’, as first ‘peoples’ (Sissons 2005, p. 126).

The European Union and Multicultural Rights

The creation of the EU has led to a growing diffusion of power away from national governments. Authority has flowed upwards to the regional level, and processes of devolution have enabled a re-location of the symbolic power of nation onto local communities, which themselves become viable through their partnerships with the EU and other international organizations and superstructures. A range of interpretations can be made about the creation of new tiers of government, which we may identify as a strategy to make engagement with government—that is, democratic participation—a viable option for all citizens. Some commentators have suggested that the diffusion indicates ‘a trend towards the emergence of a quasi-national European identity and an eclipse of national identities, others see a revival of nationalist sentiments such as ethnocentrism and xenophobia, whereas still others emphasize the growing importance of local and regional affiliations’ (Arts and Halman 2006, p. 179). These changes may further evidence a loss of confidence in ‘nation’ as an effective socio-economic and political unit, and lead to questions about the ongoing role and relevance of central government institutions including national museums, as sites where ‘the nation tells its story’ (Luke 2002, pp. 226-7). Indeed, it is probably no coincidence that, faced with a loss of effective power, many liberal governments and national museums promote positive symbols of cohesive community-based models of citizenship where, in addition to complying with the basic citizenship duties of voting and reading the newspaper, individuals have the capacity to generate a healthy civic sphere through voluntary contributions to welfare causes and participation in local clubs, associations and organizations. In Britain, these anxieties have been manifested by attempts to neutralize any potentially divisive focus on heroic symbols of national or racial or religious identity, and reiterate instead the culture and role of local communities and services in the process of individual identity-formation. In return for the privilege of social membership, people are expected to contribute to the health and security of the local area by building communities of interest.

While these shifts in power have tended to be associated with globalization and the new forms of population movement endemic to it, they have more recently been attributed to the expansion of the European Union into principally a constitutional, rights-driven superstructure that functions as ‘a central bank, bureaucracy and single currency’ (Stevenson 2006, p. 488). This reality contrasts with the image of the EU as an intergovernmental organization that many had hoped would generate a shared sense of collective or common purpose between states and possibly manifest in a European ‘social state’ (or civil society) that would protect citizens from any market uncertainty and any regressive forces of nationalism like those which marked the first half of the twentieth century (Stevenson 2006, pp. 488-9). However, despite any debate over its capacity to manifest meaningful links with individuals, a key rationale for the formation of the EU was to create and promote an overarching conception of social integration and cooperation throughout the political union. Indeed, while recent re-evaluations of citizenship can be seen to reflect anxieties about the diffusion of authority, the existence of the EU networks has made available a range of new approaches, infrastructures and funding opportunities to deal with the problems of cohesion identified by many European countries, including Britain, where national security and social integration have been used in defence of the current backlash against notions of multiculturalism, cultural diversity and other forms of social inclusion.
Loss of confidence in multiculturalism was epitomized in Britain in 2006 by Black Labour politician and former political journalist, Trevor Phillips, who, after supporting multiculturalism for many years, became one of its most outspoken mainstream critics. He expressed fears that multiculturalism could cause Britain to ‘sleepwalk towards segregation’ (in Casciani 2006), and predicted that the balkanized ghettos seen in American cities would be repeated throughout Britain. In his capacity as Chancellor of the Exchequer (just prior to being named British Prime Minister), Gordon Brown also proclaimed the failure of multiculturalism, in terms that were reaffirmed by the Leader of the Opposition, David Cameron, who remarked evocatively that ‘The doctrine of multiculturalism has undermined our nation’s sense of cohesiveness because it emphasizes what divides us rather than what brings us together’ (Johnston 2007, Cameron 2007). The terms of this backlash echo the sentiments expressed by sociologist Nathan Glazer (1997) and others who have claimed that multiculturalism has failed and that the United States is fragmenting along ethnic divisions. A further instance of the trend to reconstruct diversity according to cohesion was an inquiry held in 2007 into what local and practical action was needed to overcome the barriers to integration and cohesion in Britain. The investigation by the independent Commission on Integration and Cohesion, chaired by Darra Singh and established by Communities Secretary, Ruth Kelly, led to the publication of a report entitled Our shared future (2007). Its recommendations downplayed the potentially unifying role of nation at every opportunity, privileging instead the language of EU policy and the creation of allegiances between local cultures and international policy. Advance commentary about the report in the Guardian (Bunting 2007, p. 1) noted: ‘Multiculturalism is conspicuously absent [from the report] … Nor will there be any profound insights into Britishness; it is more interested in local identities and connections to place—such as Brummie or Geordie—than the big national picture’. Newspaper coverage criticized the Commission for bypassing multiculturalism and for avoiding the difficult task of identifying where associations with nation, and concepts of national identity, fit into the picture.

The rephrasing of previous policy initiatives of multiculturalism and cultural diversity according to rhetorics of cohesion has been accompanied by a renewal of governmental interest in the wellbeing of local areas, and Seyla Benhabib (2007, p. 22) has observed that ‘We are moving away from citizenship as national membership increasingly towards a citizenship of residency which strengthens the multiple ties to locality, to the region, and to transnational institutions’. As a result of this change, dominant understandings of diversity have also been transformed. Instead of signalling difference that is ethnic, cultural, religious or racial, diversity discourses now focus on regional differences in the hope that people will identify principally with the region in which they live. These have been supported by social policy initiatives of neighbourhood renewal and community cohesion that, in some cases, promote opportunities for improved local public service provision. Recognizing that nationalism and the state can still claim an imaginary but motivating power that can fuel conflict, public policy in Britain now seeks to encourage citizens to engage in the first instance with their boroughs and local communities of residence, rather than the (beleaguered) symbolic English nation, or their place of birth. This measure seeks, at least superficially, to disrupt nationalism’s potentially divisive links between cultural identity and place by relocating the focus onto communities and cultures of shared interest. Although these developments are, as Stevenson (2006, p. 496) explains, ‘increasingly necessary in the face of racist nationalisms, which seek to defend “our” common heritage or home against others (immigrants, asylum seekers, migrant workers)’, the emergence of locality as a primary site of inclusion, governance and wellbeing has been criticized for its potential to reactivate the idea that communities can serve the dominant moral order and produce civic order by promoting particular forms of behaviour and types of allegiance and affiliation that assert notions of
inclusion instead of raising questions of equity and inequality (Rose 1996, 2000b). Indeed, on the basis that the rhetoric producing public policy initiatives of cohesion is not supported by the provision of sufficient infrastructure or services (due to the withdrawal of provision for English as a second language classes and the reduction of legal aid for asylum-seekers, for instance), Jon Burnett (2007, p. 355) contends that community cohesion has become a ‘euphemism for integration; and integration a euphemism for assimilation. … while assimilation suggests a form of ‘hyper-inclusion’ of certain forms of diversity, it also tells us equally about the forms of diversity that will not be recognized or accepted’.

There exists a paradox in this promotion of ‘the local’ by the national—where people are asked to build communities of work, support and wellbeing, and be proactive about their involvement with the local civic sphere through volunteer work and membership of clubs and organizations—because it appears simultaneously to undermine and bolster the totalizing discourses of national cohesion and ‘unity in diversity’ (as the motto adopted in 2004 for the EU). On the one hand, the contemporary currency of signs of local engagement, as evidenced by a healthy civic sphere with high levels of voluntary participation, are designed to produce nostalgic associations between local areas and the symbols and concepts of nation as an imagined community. However, at the same time as these traditional images of ‘belonging’ to a local area reassure residents and please tourists, they can also be understood as operating within (and produced by) the logic of a market-driven global economy, and enjoying the free-trade agreements as negotiated through supranational organizations including the EU. The paradox deepens when we consider that the community cohesion agenda may, through its promotion of the local, the relational, and the deliberative, aim to build a civil society out of the networks of community groups, associations, and voluntary organizations that are not part of government and that equally, do not operate as private companies in the market. This may be motivated by the belief that civil society is important because it connects with part of our lives that the state or the market do not reach. Alternately, it may be motivated by recognition that while civil society provides a context in which citizens can cooperatively pursue their comprehensive vision of the good life, it also, and without coercion, educates citizens about the principles, practices, and virtues required for the success of democratic institutions (Jensen 2006, p. 47, Skidmore and Bound 2008). As such, community cohesion may embody the primary aim of redefining identity as shared codes of behaviour among citizens and would-be citizens of the European Union.

The European Capital of Culture Initiative

The overlaying of local interests by a global superstructure is epitomized by the high-profile European Capital of Culture initiative (established by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers to run from 2005 to 2019), which seeks to pair European Union cultural policy with regional areas in order to expand the EU’s profile, influence and popularity. This contradiction becomes more apparent in context of fears that market-driven globalization will drown small cultural producers out of policy debates (if not markets) by a chorus of larger corporate players and by governments that aim to maximize the potential of culture as a strategic resource (that can be used, for example, in the creation of national cohesion, pride, or wellbeing). This reiterates the fear that globalization can lead to the commodification of traditional culture. Commentators often observe that the challenge national policy makers and global governance experts now face is how to ‘protect cultural freedom, promote multicultural identities and simultaneously recognize the property rights of cultural producers’ (Drache and Froese 2006, p. 363; See also Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2006).

3 The European Capital of Culture programme was established by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers to run from 2005 to 2019. The programme follows on from the European Cities of Culture programme which ended in 2004. Under the new programme, each Member State has been assigned a year for which to nominate a city to hold the title. The Independent Advisory Panel for the UK nomination for
Here, culture acts as a tool of politics to act on and increase European intervention within the social. Even though the cities selected to be European Capitals of Culture are decided at a national level (in Liverpool’s case, a national competition organised by DCMS), they aim to create a bridge between the concept and expansive governance structure of the European Union (or European ‘Community’ as it has previously been called), and local areas, contributing to the ‘growing diffusion of power away from national governments; both upwards to the regional level of the European Union and downwards to the sub-national level of provincial, state and municipal governments’ (Harmes 2006:725). Forged by cultural policy, connections between the EU and the local areas also provide a positive, symbolic representation of the wider EU aim to create a new umbrella of governance under which local areas and regions can identify, and hence enhances EU rhetoric to build the perception that the EU is a ‘community of cultures’ that promotes the collectivist ideal of ‘unity in diversity’. This discourse is equivalent to the British concept of social cohesion because it focuses similarly on creating a federated union that is composite (inclusive of difference) but unified (European Communities 2002, p. 3).

Analysis of the material produced by Liverpool’s 2003 bid to become European Capital of Culture 2008 reveals that the dominant perception of the city is that its strong sense of cultural identity has been shaped by its history as a port, by the impact of immigration and particular religious and political traditions, and by the subsequent impression that it is a city with ‘national marginality and world centrality’ (Berg 2005, p. 232). Liverpool’s successful bid for the title repositioned the historic fact of Liverpool’s economic isolation within a contemporary context as evidence of the city’s ‘independence’, which is used to promote the policy ideal that individuals should recognize their local area as the primary site for cultural identification, rather than taking a generic, pre-existing or nostalgic ‘British’ set of values that have been shaken and uprooted by recent events. The opening statement in the executive summary of Liverpool’s bid makes a point of celebrating the city’s track record in utilizing culture as a key tool of renewal:

This is a city where strong local identity embraces cultural diversity. Liverpool’s 800-year history has given the city one of the longest established truly cosmopolitan communities in Britain, second perhaps only to London. While tradition has its place, Liverpool has learned the lessons of urban cohesion—sometimes from conflict and adversity—to emerge as a confluence of a myriad of cultures, which can now claim to lead by example, even on a world stage.4

Consistent with this example, and with the European Capital of Culture initiative more broadly, connections between regional wellbeing discourses and international policy interests are promoted through policies produced by national government, in a move that makes national governments appear compliant with the redirection of power upward to the overarching superstructure of the EU at the expense of their own visibility. However, it may be that, to quote Stevenson (2006, p. 497), ‘the kind of progressive European solidarity that is being articulated here’ aims to avoid replicating a context in which “‘the nation” becomes an

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4 Culture in all its configurations is perceived as central to Liverpool’s successful bid for the European Capital of Culture 2008 title. One section of the executive summary of the bid reports: ‘Culture, with its potential to drive both tourism and inward investment, as well as deal with the enormous challenges of regenerating communities, is a key tool’ (LCC 2002, p. 201). In this context, culture is used to characterize all forms of social exchange, ethnic identifications, lifestyle choices, and the geographies of taste and value that are both aesthetic and economic.
anchor in the troubled waters of globalization’, and thus attempts to remove ‘nation’ from the equation, encouraging individuals to identify with local regions and contribute to the wellbeing of their communities in its place. The remapping of diversity onto local region (away from ethnicity) is exemplified by Ruth Kelly’s statement (in Bunting 2007, p. 1) that ‘Fundamentally, the challenge [to national social cohesion] is at local level, identity is primarily located at the local level’. It may also reflect the more overarching loss of confidence in the central agency of the nation. Delanty’s idea (2007a, p. 70) that citizenship has been ‘split into fragments and has lost its capacity to be integrative’ seems to make sense of this complex context, despite uncovering a tension where even though the promotion of local areas has been a central government initiative, it compromises traditional concepts of citizenship because it allows for the possibility of multiple identities and multiple points of identification. I take this to mean that by suggesting that individuals should identify principally with the local areas in which they reside, national government has also effectively allowed for the possibility of choice—and must therefore be prepared that individuals will, despite the advice, choose to practice different cultures of citizenship.

We can begin to make sense of these tensions by observing that on the one hand, citizenship is both understood in increasingly liberal terms, and identified as a participant in an increasingly contested domain in which the state is only one actor, where it is ‘no longer the sole frame of citizenship in the face of new nationalisms and cross-border affinities that no single government apparatus can contain’ (Feldblum in Miller 2001, p. 5). Indeed, citizenship is now routinely described according to more subjective reflections on what binds us, what we expect from life and of what we are, and from the understanding that a concrete sense of community and reflection on one’s own identities and everyday interpersonal interactions contribute importantly to the way citizenship is experienced and represented. However, national governments continue to be perceived as powerful defenders of culture (Barker and Dumont 2006, p. 134), if not the main guarantor of human rights (Delanty 2007a, p. 71). And museums have always been instrumental to the central role citizenship has had in ongoing projects of national cultural homogenization. Both sides of the debate have been played out in responses to the National Museum of the American Indian, which has been identified by some commentators as a site that advocates successfully for Native concerns, while for others, the museum is perceived to represent a compelling if not oppressive image of federal government authority. It is to a discussion of the contradictions inherent in the relationship between calls for Native sovereignty and the symbols and colonial legacy of the federated United States of America—summarized in the national motto: ‘E pluribus unum’: ‘out of many, one’—that I now turn.

The National Museum of the American Indian and Self-Governance Rights

In contrast to nationalism, which has been defined as a political ideology with culture at its center (Smith 1991, p. 74), self-determination has been defined as ‘the right of a distinct and identifiable group of people or a separate political state to set the standards and mores of what constitutes its traditional culture and how it will honour and practice that culture’ (Miller 2005, p. 123 in McMullen 2008). The National Museum of the American Indian (hereafter referred to as the NMAI) attempts to balance ideas of mainstream American nationalism that are embraced by its largely non-Native visitors to the Mall Museum, with the ideas of tribal sovereignty and independence that are embraced for the most by large sections of the museum’s Native constituents. This means that discussions about nation, nationalism, affiliation, and citizenship are complex and problematic for the NMAI, which, despite being a national museum, has an international mandate, and privileges images of shared, multi-tribal authority. In light of its broad remit, the National Museum of the American Indian recognizes the value of both engaging with and modelling the ‘bottom-up’ practices of community
engagement that are employed by intermediary institutions including the cultural centers and tribal museums located within and governed by one of the 562 federally recognized tribes, as well as the many other tribes, and or/communities that seek status as independent sovereign nations (Abrams 2004, p. 3) and which may or may not accept the concept of a singular American nation-state. This sense of potentially conflicting loyalties and a subsequent awareness of the requirement to balance multiple conceptions and indeed cultures of citizenship led the founding director of the NMAI, W. Richard West Jr, to contend that the museum must embody a paradigm shift. In a frequently-quoted statement, West (in Evelyn and Hirsch 2006, p. 90) asserts that the NMAI ‘has the capacity for becoming a larger social and civil space, a national and international forum . . . regarding Native peoples and cultures and their broad and deep experience, past and present’. This statement reiterates the spirit of the NMAI’s conception as represented in the institution’s central planning treatise, The Way of the People (Smithsonian Institution Office of Design and Construction 1991, p. 103) which articulated that the NMAI would ‘extend and change the definition of a museum within the Smithsonian Institution and in the perceptions of its visitors, through conducting traditional museum activities in new ways’. And, perhaps indicating success in regard to this aspiration, in 2006, the NMAI was itself described by at least one commentator as being ‘like a tribal museum’ (Jacknis 2006, p. 532).

The NMAI was established by an act of Congress in 1989 and embodied a new spirit of reconciliation as well as a revitalized interest in cultural politics and the aim to reconnect collections and communities. The Washington campus of the museum opened on the Mall in September 2004. Replicating a kind of multifaceted, multidirectional constellation, the NMAI is comprised of individual and collective and personal and institutional voices, and bargers consciously with the idea that museums are valuable both to the government and diverse publics because of their widespread role and key investment in the project of identity-making. The museum renders voices both figuratively and pragmatically, and its process of collaborative decision-making is epitomized by the Welcome Wall—where hundreds of written and spoken words meaning ‘welcome’ in Native languages from throughout the Americas are projected onto a 23-foot screen above the Welcome Desk inside the entrance. Within this highly animated representational sphere, these voices (and the collections and stories that they speak to, through and for) connote the museum’s aim to engage with the social life of Native American people and communities beyond its walls. Most of all, it acknowledges that the full possibilities of citizenship can only be produced and maintained if individuals feel they have a voice and the ‘the space in which to exercise a voice’ (Couldry 2006, p. 326; See also West 1993, pp. 5–8). In this mode, the institution adopts the role of social activist, and lobbies for a greater recognition of cultural rights (including the repatriation of heritage and the preservation of language) and human rights (including access to health, education, employment and housing services). At the same time as it demonstrates the potential for federal government agencies and local tribal organizations to work as productive partners, the museum’s attention to representing pluralism clearly encourages Native Americans to identify simultaneously as Indigenous citizens and citizens of the United States (Sissons 2005, p. 115).

The NMAI’s developers were motivated by the principle that community ownership of the museum or cultural center should be apparent at all levels of the museum’s operations, particularly in relation to management. The principle is manifest in its mission, goals and objectives, but is most clearly depicted through the make-up of the NMAI’s Board of Trustees, which is legislated to have 23 members, 50 percent or more of whom will be Native American. Indeed, the NMAI has aimed to model itself as a cultural center-like museum (Jacknis 2006, p. 532, Cooper 2006, p. 8) that is ‘national’ insofar as it brings together or ‘federates’ the diverse interests of its key constituents and communities by representing the
collective presence and agency of the many communities. Despite the NMAI’s attention to pluralism, however, the question of who—federal government or Native nation—ultimately has the right to define the field of citizenship becomes very difficult in view of the fact that the American tradition of citizenship has tended to stress engagement with the local community rather than a central bureaucratic state (Putnam 2000). The tension between state or national identity and tribal sovereignty was rendered acute by the concerns expressed by some commentators over the symbolic meaning of the placement of the NMAI on the National Mall in Washington DC, directly opposite the Capitol Building. 5 This tension is also apparent in the *The Way of the People* (Smithsonian Institution Office of Design and Construction 1991, p. 102), in which consultants explained that the design of the NMAI:

could be seen as analogous in some ways to that of a nation’s embassy in a foreign capital. … This analogy of course is only partial: there are hundreds of sovereign Native nations of this hemisphere represented by the Museum and many of their people are United States citizens.

The NMAI’s focus—as stated in its mission—on ‘contemporary culture and cultural achievements of the Natives of the Western Hemisphere’ (http://www.nmai.si.edu) offers a clear indication that the museum aimed to foreground and privilege the concept of cultural citizenship over a more traditional, and politically fraught definition of the term as tied exclusively to ideas of nationalism (where, for instance, citizens enact allegiance to the nation as an imagined political entity that has the power to confer legitimacy but also to reject claims to membership) (Cobb 2005, p. 489, p. 492). The shift away from purely political notions of citizenship may have been designed to avoid butting up against the reality that in the US as elsewhere, citizenship has become a site of competing visions of political community, as well as the recognition that this is nowhere more apparent than in forums representing relationships between the federal government of the United States, Native nations, and other federally recognized and unrecognized tribes. However, disappointment in the perceived lack or absence of politics and statements about sovereignty from the museum have been expressed by a number of Native commentators, including a former NMAI employee, Jacki Thompson Rand (2007, p. 134), who argued that the institution’s focus on cultural recognition and the representation of traditional and contemporary arts is not sufficient to motivate real change. In terms reminiscent of Ong’s (1996, p. 738) critique of Rosaldo’s claims for cultural citizenship, Thompson Rand argues that cultural recognition ‘will not create a working arena where Native America might engage the United States government on something resembling level ground’, but will only provide a distraction from the core project of achieving social justice, political power, and economic change for Native Americans. Her response shows that there is diversity of opinion and debate amongst Native Americans regarding the potential for culture to produce a satisfactory experience of citizenship. Other commentators have similarly argued that the basis for an effective indigenous citizenship would need to strengthen the potential for participatory democracy (ideally through increased direct representation in Congress) rather than emerge exclusively from the notion of cultural autonomy or cultural citizenship.

Designed in the mode of aspirational intermediary institution, the NMAI aims to mediate between the federal government and the museum’s regional and international publics and core communities and constituents. The aim to create a ‘long-term collaboration between the National Museum of the American Indian and Native communities’ (Cooper 2006, p. 9) also responds to the *Tribal Museums in American* report (Abrams 2004) that presented results of a survey that sought to determine ‘the present overall status, current situation, needs, and

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5 For an emblematic range of responses to the NMAI see *The Public Historian* 28(2), 2006, and *American Indian Quarterly* 30(3 and 4), 2006.
expectations of a wide range of tribal museums and cultural centers throughout the United States’ (Abrams 2004, p. 3). According to the report’s author, George H.J. Abrams (2004, p. 24), ‘one of the major conclusions to emerge from this survey is the almost universal expression of need for the creation of a national American Indian tribal museum association; a freestanding organization unaffiliated with any existing organization’. The NMAI may prefer to produce the image of partnership in the network (rather than ownership over it) to avoid the fact of their affiliation both with the Smithsonian and with federal government. The image of independence may also work to downplay perceptions that the museum functions as an instrument of the government that promotes and neutralizes public policy and provides the role as ‘a facilitator of cross-cultural exchange with a view to taking the sting out of the politics of difference within the wider society’ (Bennett 2006, p. 59). Perception of the NMAI as independent is important also because, according to Abrams (2004, p. 24):

Some [tribal museums] also see such an organization as a potential lobbying organization to press for legislation favourable to the Indian museum movement in the United States. Advocacy ranks relatively high by respondents, and they picture an organization representing tribal museums at the national level.

The NMAI’s interest in facilitating the development and ongoing progress of a network of tribal museums across the United States offers a general example that illustrates the broad range of cultural agents that are active across the political, social and cultural spectrum. In this instance alone, the museum may attempt or be seen to mediate between the federal government and tribal communities and nations, offering ‘public relations for tribal government’ (Abrams 2004, p. 7), as well as promoting federal government services. While Penney (2000, p. 47) notes that Native American consultants, advisory board and community representatives are often ‘confused about the intentions of museums when they are asked to participate’ in their programmes, one NMAI curator interviewed for this paper suggested that in fact communities agreed to the NMAI’s invitations to be involved in the museum’s opening exhibitions (such as Our Peoples: Giving Voice to Our Histories) because they hoped that the museum would function as an intermediary institution by providing a stage that would accommodate and legitimize their political concerns. In another context, McMullen (2008) says that tribal participation in the museum’s programmes may be ‘strategically aimed at increasing community visibility and contributing toward federal recognition as a tribe with their own cultural traditions’.

The desire to function as an intermediary institution charges the NMAI with providing a clearly defined use-value or social functionality that moves beyond educational programmes to embrace public service and social development ideals so that it can motivate action beyond its walls. Rather than producing the conditions for negotiation that the dialogical civil sphere environment would seek to evoke, this means that postcolonial and cultural diversity discourses are overlaid against the ideals of liberal citizenship that are more usually associated with traditional nation-building exercises, and that these expand (via the museum’s exhibitions, collections, resources, and public outreach programmes) to impact beyond the museum’s immediate environment. Indeed, while she does not use this terminology, it is clear that Thompson Rand’s critique of the NMAI is based at least in part on her perception that it fails in its responsibility to function as an intermediary institution. In this guise, the museum would present an accurate history of colonial encounter and its effects. It would provide a bridge between the museum’s resources and collections and the communities who are traditional owners of the cultural patrimony. Most importantly though, if the museum were to function as an intermediary institution, it would recognise and inspire Native Americans to engage in activism and community leadership. It would aspire to more than cultural recognition and celebrate examples that include ‘the successes of the Chickasaw Nation’, who have used casino proceeds to benefit the people in the form of a wellness center, counselling
center, library, scholarships, an aviation and science summer academy, and rebuilt stomp grounds (for an annual green corn dance), ‘the devoted activism and scholarship of Andrea Smith, and the ongoing work of community-based activists’ (Thompson Rand 2007).

Conclusion

Thompson Rand’s response to the NMAI is important and it echoes claims that the current urban regeneration of Liverpool is likely to achieve little if any marked improvement in social membership, nor diminish social inequality. In their study of Liverpool’s bid, Paul Jones and Stuart Wilks-Heeg (2004, p. 353) similarly argue that there is a significant danger that Liverpool Capital of Culture will engender a ‘politics that celebrates marginality rather than seeking to redress it’. This analysis reveals the underlying tension separating the perception that culture is a tool for economic growth from the contention that cultural policy can produce and embrace grassroots and community based activity. It also makes the point that the Capital of Culture bid and corresponding events are cultural policy initiatives which are not politically neutral but inherently bound up with political economy and its attendant social inequalities. Indeed, ‘the real danger’ may be that ‘Liverpool’s oft-cited “renaissance” will not include those who operate outside of a politically sanctioned culture that can be incorporated into the new re-branded image of the city’ (Jones and Wilks-Heeg 2004, p. 357).

And yet, while there can be little doubt that top-down, policy-driven cultural activities (like the Liverpool Capital of Culture 2008) most often promote the development of entrepreneurial behaviour intended to attract the tourist dollar rather than the re-integration of locals into a shared space of meaningful exchange, it is important to make the point that culture continues to be recognized as a tool that is valuable for source communities and community-based ‘bottom-up’ activism as well as governments and markets. Advocacy (that is no less political but more locally—rather than nationally—directed) and negotiation continue to be valued by museums and public policy as keywords that are understood to offer effective ways of facilitating the development of community networks, strategies that enable community involvement in the museum, and an active sense of citizenship. Indeed, this is the core aspiration of the NMAI, which is predicated on the expectation that the promotion of cultural confidence and recognition are central to any attempt to redress the social problems experienced by Native Americans. The NMAI’s focus on community as a site of cultural production and agency confers with Dahlgren’s (2006, p. 273) argument that citizenship is, ‘in part, a question of learning by doing, but also that civic competence cannot derive exclusively from political society; [emerging instead] from the overall development of the subject’.

I do not have sufficient space to discuss further examples where individuals and community groups have themselves utilized culture to their political advantage, but it is important to note that this does happen in the EU and Britain (see the Self-Build Cities programme, for example, the Glasgow 2020 project in Hassan et. al 2007), and in the USA, where the clearest examples are Native cultural centers and tribal museums. A single, if not exemplary illustration of this is the Alutiiq Museum and Archaeological Repository in Alaska, which was conceptualized in the late 1970s when the Kodiak Area Native Association—a nonprofit organization that provides healthcare and social services to Kodiak’s Native people—‘recognized the reawakening and preserving of Alutiiq traditions as essential to community healing’ (Steffian 2006, p. 32). Importantly, the Alutiiq Museum aimed to avoid simply ‘re-presenting’ civil society in existing institutions and preferred to offer new ways of ‘doing’ cultural politics by de-linking the concept of citizenship from one determined by nation to one that becomes multiple and increasingly democratic. As such, it may provide an illustration of Jürgen Habermas’ emphatic call for the urgent expansion and multiplication of spaces within which citizens may shape the rules, policies and decisions that
govern their lives at the local, national and supranational levels (Habermas 2001, Arneil 2007, pp. 301-28.). This example also makes the point that we should remain wary of overstating the extent of governmental reach, so as to avoid challenging the potential that particular circumstance, seized discourse, contestation and compromise have to develop into new processes and forms of government and even altered relationships between individuals and the state, which may even result in the creation of new definitions of citizenship and new sites of sovereignty.

The European Capital of Culture initiative, the National Museum of the American Indian, and the Alutiiq Museum all offer proof that museums and cultural initiatives are publicly understood as providing social and as political spaces, as well as cultural ones. Each of these case studies have been produced by partnerships between different levels of government and community organizations—the Liverpool Council and the European Union in the first case, the Smithsonian Institution, the US federal government, and many tribal authorities in the second, and a number of local community organizations in the third. Looked at comparatively, they express different and sometimes multiple conceptions of citizenship, and provide loose illustrations of Kymlicka and Norman’s (1994) concepts of multicultural rights and self-governance rights in relation to the EU and USA. However, rather than representing neatly bounded ‘cultures’ (even if they try), these examples demonstrate difficult-to-define and contested distributions and even constituents in some cases. When accompanied by the concerns of Thompson Rand (2007) and Jones and Wilks-Heeg (2004) that cultural rights do not easily equate to political change, this complex field may lead us to question the utility of the term ‘cultural citizenship’, or the currency of the concept of European identity. Indeed, instead of assuming that we already know what cultural citizenship or European identity is, who these processes benefit, and what purposes they may have, we may be better to focus our investigation on the particular practices, ‘cultures’ and politics of citizenship and identity that play out in everyday communicative spaces as well as through museums, government policy, and in other institutions that create or challenge dominant cultural imaginaries.

References


