From Imperial Capital to Global City: Changing Identities in London

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London: An Ambiguous City
London has long played an ambiguous role within the nation. From its origins as a port it has faced outwards maintaining trade networks radiating across Continental Europe and further afield. As the capital of an emerging nation-state it faced inwards. Within the capital there was another tension – between the City of London whose mercantile elite looked outwards and jealously guarded its privileges against the Church and a monarchy based not far away at Westminster. An expanding empire further increased these tensions as City of London investments in overseas markets encouraged the development of local industry and business elites who began to compete with British businesses and challenge imperial controls.

The Growth of Victorian London, Social Class and Political Representation
London expanded rapidly during the 19th century as the City of London, the ‘West End’ of monarchy, government and entertainment was joined by the vast expanse of suburbs linked to the city centre by an extensive network of railways and roads. London’s role as a commercial centre with a large white collar workforce was complemented by the growth of an industrial working class in the manufacturing belt which ran around the West End and in the expanding East End. By 1900 the adult males within this middle class had acquired voting rights as well as skilled workers within the working class. This process was the result of trade union campaigning as well as judicious political manoeuvring by the Conservative and Liberal parties and the emergent Labour Party which was close allied to the trade unions.

The Construction of a National Culture, 1880–1945
The forging of a national male electorate (women were not to gain the vote until the 1920s) was accompanied by the emergence of an assertive national consciousness and culture. A dramatic illustration of the relationship between this national consciousness and imperialism came with the outpouring of ‘jingoes’ which was unleashed by military setbacks during the S. African ‘Boer wars’ and such events as the relief of Mafeking. The forging of national culture involved the establishment of sharp boundary between insiders and outsiders which drew on religious and racial differences. Despite historical tensions between the Established Church (Church of England) and Nonconformist sects the construction of a British nationalism encouraged a sense of what these religious congregations shared through Protestant traditions.

This process of constructing an indigenous majority went hand in hand with maintaining a boundary between Protestants, on the one hand, and Catholics and Jews on the other. Since many Catholics had migrated from Ireland and most Jews had migrated from Eastern Europe, this process of boundary maintenance inevitably involved the issues of both race and immigration. Racial typologies were promoted to differentiate those at the top of the hierarchy – Anglo-Saxon Protestants – from ‘lesser types’. This racialisation of difference raised the thorny question of assimilation and integration. Assimilation required outsiders to become insiders through a wholesale rejection of their original cultural traditions, while integration entailed a less radical process whereby different groups maintained their cultural differences while participating fully in the social, economic and political life of the nation.

As the first generation of sojourners gave way to subsequent generations of settlers ‘born and bred’ within Britain so the issue of assimilation and integration became ever more pressing. Class played a key role here since those moving away from the inner working class immigrant enclaves into suburban middle class neighbourhoods were far more likely to assimilate. During the 1920s and 1930s political parties also played their part especially in minority enclaves where leaders from the minority groups encouraged engagement with
national and local political debates and competitions. In London’s working class areas, particularly the East End, the integration of the new settlers was encouraged by ‘municipal socialism’, trade unions and community organisations where the Labour Party competed strongly with Communists on the Left and fascists ‘Blackshirts’ on the Right.

‘New Commonwealth’ Immigration and Loss of Empire: Reconstructing National Identity and Racism

The speedy unravelling of empire after 1945 led to a painful revision of British national consciousness. Although the Aliens Act of 1905 was the first legislative attempt to establish a boundary between insiders and outsiders, it was primarily directed against East European Jewish immigrants whereas the 1948 Nationality Act was the first of many parliamentary attempts to deal with the imperial heritage. It was designed to regularise the position of those of British descent who wished to return to the ‘motherland’. In the same year, however, the SS Empire Windrush arrived with migrant workers from Britain’s colonies in the West Indies, some of whom had fought for Britain during the Second World War. These ‘black’ settlers eventually claimed rights of residence and thereby challenged the indirectly racialising effects of any distinction which defined insiders in terms of blood and, indirectly or directly, of whiteness.

Majority opinion within Britain during the 1950s and 1960s was probably in favour of the assimilation of the country’s settlers from the ‘New Commonwealth’ (principally the former colonies in the West Indies, Africa, S. Asia, as well as Cyprus and Hong Kong). However, pluralistic integration was established as the dominant political principle within the two leading parties (Conservative and Labour). London attracted the largest numbers of migrants and was well on the way to its current situation where over 300 languages are spoken across the metropolis. The concentration of migrants within the ‘inner city’ boroughs which circled the City of London and the West End presented both a challenge and an opportunity to the locally dominant political body, the Labour Party. It challenged its willingness to be open to the newcomers and it presented the opportunity to bolster its electoral fortunes if the party opened its doors. During the late 1970s and early 1980s the Greater London Council and the Inner London Education Authority led the way in anti-racist policies designed to encourage ‘black and Asian’ political participation – a strategy which Labour-controlled boroughs also adopted with varying degrees of rapidity. By the late 1990s the effects of this strategy were to be seen in the emergence of black and Asian politicians and community leaders at every level of the metropolitan and national political structure.

Post-1945 Industrial Redevelopment and the Domination of the Service Sector

The political and social transformation of inner London through immigration between 1945 and 1990 was accompanied by extensive social change. The industrial base of the Victorian industrial belt surrounding the City and the West End rapidly weakened after an initial restoration of fortunes after 1945, although some sectors such as the garment industry were revived between 1960 and 1990 by ‘New Commonwealth’ immigration. The gradual closure of the East End docks between 1960 and 1975 was the most striking reminder of inner London’s declining industrial base. Although industry remained a significant employer in the outer boroughs, the traditionally strong service sector became even more dominant across the metropolis as a whole. As ever, the City of London played a key role in this process, particularly after the ‘Big Bang’ of the mid-1970s which opened the City to global investment even more drastically and ushered in a process where British companies were forced to compete – often unsuccessfully – with newcomers from N. America, Japan and the Middle East in particular.
The pre-eminence of services was forcefully expressed by the establishment of the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) in 1979. A year previously Margaret Thatcher had led the Conservatives to victory in the national elections and one of the new government’s initiatives was to overturn the attempt by local Labour councils to redevelop the derelict docks for industry and subsidised council housing. The LDDC’s brief was to turn the docks into an extension of the City of London. While the newspaper industry was allowed space within the new area called ‘Docklands’, it was primarily intended as a workplace for the finance and business sector. New housing was designed for white collar owner-occupiers rather than the indigenous working class (see Eade 2000).

Global Restructuring and Social Change
The social impact of LDDC redevelopment in the East End borough most deeply affected during the 1980s and 1990s was to establish a sharp division between wealthy professionals employed in the finance and business sector and those pursuing manual occupations. The newcomers who settled in the owner occupied housing were predominantly white in contrast to the Bangladeshis, Somalis, W. Africans, Vietnamese who found jobs in the declining industrial sector or in the expanding low cost shops, restaurants, cafes and travel services. This social division was most evident in the borough of Tower Hamlets, where LDDC redevelopment resulted in a striking division between the white old working class communities and the new service class in the south and the Bangladeshi-dominated neighbourhoods to the north.

The transformation effected by the LDDC in the East End was dramatic but restructuring metropolitan space to attract global flows of capital, people and goods has significant effects elsewhere. In the elite neighbourhoods of Mayfair and Bayswater, for example, the old money of aristocracy and the established indigenous upper middle class was joined by a global elite whose presence was discreetly protected by the government (both Conservative and Labour). The transnational networks maintained by the global elite and the poor migrant workers operated at vastly different levels- economically, culturally and politically. These differences enabled global elite members from Muslim-majority countries to evade the suspicion and surveillance to which poor Muslims became subject, especially after the 9/11 destruction of the World Trade Center in New York and the terrorist bombs of 7/7 in London itself.

The Resurgence of the Multicultural Global City
These economic and social developments have played a key role in establishing London’s contemporary position as a vibrant, multicultural city. It is difficult now to remember the gloomy prognoses of metropolitan decline during the 1950s and 1960s. At the same time London’s current prosperity conceals a sharp division between the global elite and the professionals within the new service class, on the one hand, and those at the lower levels of the economic hierarchy who are competing for poorly paid and insecure jobs or facing long term unemployment (see Sassen 2001, Evans et al. 2005). This polarisation may have been overemphasised and significant numbers of black and Asian settlers are moving away from the poor, inner London ethnic enclaves (see Samers 2002). However, the intensity of competition at the lower levels of the economic hierarchy has been intensified by the arrival of central and eastern European migrants, particularly after the A8 nations entered the European Union in May 2004. The willingness of these circular migrants to take up routine low wage jobs has worsened the plight of young black and Asian workers as well as the refugees and asylum seekers who came to London during the 1990s. The wide variety of countries from which these migrants have come has also seriously weakened the strategy of representing people according to their ethnic background - what Vertovec (2004) calls the problem of super-diversity.
British Bangladeshi Muslims – The Islamisation of Urban Space and the Bengali New Year Celebration

Having outlined the major processes shaping London since the Victorian period I will develop two case studies to show how some of the issues described have shaped developments at the local level. The first case study involves Bangladeshi Muslims in Tower Hamlets who have made the northern wards of Tower Hamlets their stronghold. The first generation had settled in the area during the 1960s and 1970s and the second generation had forged alliances with white Labour Party Activists during the 1980s around secular, anti-racist policies (see Eade 1989). The arrival of wives and dependants in the 1980s and early 1990s encouraged a process of Islamisation which involved the establishment of mosques, madrassahs and Islamist organisations (see Eade 1997). This process was encouraged by the central government’s encouragement of ‘faith communities’, especially after the victory of ‘New Labour’ in the 1976 general election. Secularists and Islamists competed for public recognition and funding in a struggle for ‘hearts and minds’ which linked London’s localities to events taking place around the globe, especially in Bangladesh.

These different understandings were vividly illustrated in recent debates concerning the celebration of Bengali New Year (Baishakhi mela). The mela had been introduced in 1998 as a multicultural event financed by Cityside, a government-funded quango which promoted community arts in Tower Hamlets’ western wards bordering the City of London. The mela was held in the Spitalfields – the heartland of the Bangladeshi settlement – and provided entertainment, which was intended to express the rich diversity of Bengali culture. Since music and dancing was frowned on by ‘strict’ Muslims, the organisers were careful not to offend the London Great Mosque on Brick Lane by noisy celebrations during prayer times.

The festival was associated with the Bangladesh countryside which, in turn, represented society as a whole. This society extended across national borders to embrace a transnational Bangladeshi community around the globe. The festival reminded British Bangladeshi Muslims of the cultural heritage, which they shared with their compatriots elsewhere, but it also encouraged them to behave in an egalitarian manner free from the inequalities of caste and class - not only with other Bangladeshi Muslims but with all human beings.

We see here a utopian vision of a national community which implicitly reaches beyond Bangladesh to a transnational diaspora. This vision helped to establish a common platform between Bangladeshi secular nationalists and white secularists who dominate British state institutions at central and local levels. The New Year celebrations were also linked to other local multicultural events, which were shaped by an equally secular vision of a liberal multicultural locality. The 2001 advert for the event, distributed through the internet by a virtual community of British Bangladeshi professionals, for example, makes clear that the Brick Lane Festival placed Bangladeshis within a wider history of immigration and a contemporary mixture of cultural influences.

The Brick Lane Festival captures the flavour and excitement of an area that has welcomed new Londoners for over 200 years. Taking place from 12 noon to 10pm, an amazing display of free music, dance and performance will celebrate Spitalfields [sic] rich mix of communities both past and present.

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On Brick Lane itself: pavement café’s [sic], a craft market, Asian drumming bands, Caribbean DJ’s, the London School of Samba and lots of mad Brazilians, jostle with stilt walkers, rickshaw rides, clowns and jugglers. In neighbouring Allen Gardens the main stage showcases top world music acts, alongside a children’s entertainment area with fun fair rides, massive free inflatables, stilt-walking and dance workshops.

These two events were publicly funded on the grounds that they contributed to the multicultural character of the locality and to Tower Hamlets generally. This vision of a secular, liberal society, shaped by cultural mixture, was not shared by Islamist groups. These groups were encouraged, ironically, by secularist members of the central and local state, who wished to harness the resources of ‘faith communities’ in the delivery of policy issues. Local state officials were not so eager to recognise these ‘faith communities’ but, in Tower Hamlets, the purpose-built East London Mosque (ELM) had long been active in building alliances with local officials despite opposition from some secular Bangladeshis activists at least. Benefiting from the Brick Lane Mosque’s refusal to engage directly with public organisations, the ELM’s leaders presented themselves as members of the area’s ‘central mosque’, encouraging outsiders to visit the mosque, providing help with local community schemes and generating finance to build an adjoining community centre.

Their position was further strengthened after the attack on the World Trade Center on 9/11 by media reports, which focussed on the mosque together with the more controversial centres in Finsbury Park and Shepherd’s Bush (Garbin 2001: 191). In a report on the ELM’s role in cutting truancy within Tower Hamlets, The Guardian (August 2, 2002) applauded its determination to avoid ‘fomenting fundamentalism’ and to ‘live in harmony with the wider non-Muslim community’. According to the ELM’s ‘Director’, the mosque ‘“isn’t just about praying…We want to see the well-bring of our community, see children get their basic education and local schools perform better”’. The mosque’s impact on local truancy was ‘one of a range of progressive schemes at the mosque, including discouraging the practice of forced marriage and working with youngsters on issues of drugs and gangs’. The scheme was supported by public funds given to deprived local authorities and the local ‘regeneration and external funding manager’ welcomed the initiative on the grounds that ‘conventional approaches …, such as home-school liaison workers and informing parents about the importance of attendance had not worked’. On the strength of this success the ELM leaders were going to explain ‘how the scheme works to the Council of Mosques’ in the hope that it might be adopted ‘by other LEAs with substantial Muslim communities and truancy problems’ (Ibid).

Members of the ELM management committee and the associated Young Muslim Organisation vigorously opposed the Bengali New Year festival and similar ‘multicultural’ events. Against the high-minded vision of an egalitarian national/transnational community the ELM’s imam developed the vision of a pure Islamic local/global community. He argued that the festival was an unIslamic event which would only lead young Bangladeshis astray. A properly Islamic celebration was required which would help to counter the locality’s socio-economic problems:

Drugs, alcohol and the gang-fighting and all the other wrong things…unemployment and [the] unhealthy housing situation and the cultural gap between the older and the younger generation. Families are suffering. Marriages are breaking. (Interview with Imam of the East London Mosque, 2000, quoted in Eade, Fremeaux and Garbin 2002: 168)

The imam proceeded to argue that the festival was promoted in both Bangladesh and Britain by a secular minority, whose enjoyment of fun diverted them from Islam:
In Bangladesh they don’t exercise… like this…[only a minority]…There is a secular trend and there are people who are purely having their own understanding about community, about culture…This was the culture of the Hindus…Nowadays some people are getting very much influenced by some other faith – that’s why those people are away from Islam. They look for something fun – whatever it is, which culture, which religion - no matter. (Interview with Imam of the East London Mosque, 2000, quoted in Eade, Fremeaux and Garbin 2002: 168)

This portrait of the new ‘East End’ clearly resonates with earlier constructions of London’s dark ‘Other’ but the communities visualised are different. In Islamist discourse local Muslims are part of a global community (umma), which can be redeemed through the ‘correct’ observance of Islamic practices.

This interpretation of a global Muslim community defied Western ideological assertions about the primacy of secular culture in ‘modern’ nation-states. Indeed, in the imam’s opinion, attempts by ‘modernising’ elites in Bangladesh to introduce secular nationalism were bound to fail because of the ways in which religion permeated everyday beliefs and practices. The efforts of the secular minority only resulted in the spread of Hinduism rather than secular nationalism. In other words, Bangladeshis could not escape the continuing struggle between Hindu and Muslim communities, which had determined politics in the Indian sub-continent through the partition of British India in 1946, the conflicts between India and Pakistan and the tensions between India and Bangladesh after the latter’s creation in 1971. However, what this deterministic vision failed to acknowledge, of course, was the role of both non-religious forces and contingency in this politics of identity. These conflicts were not inevitable and unchanging and what caused them could not be reduced to religious forces.

In spite of the tendency to present sharply contrasting visions of Islamic and secular communities, secularists and Islamists do not constitute homogeneous constituencies nor are they relentlessly opposed to one another. The ELM’s website, for example, in February 2006 criticised those lampooning the Prophet but called for a peaceful and reasoned response:

This appears to be a deliberate attempt to demonise Islam and Muslims, evoking disturbing memories of similar caricatures used against Jews and their religious beliefs in parts of Europe in the 1930s. The East London Mosque calls on Muslims to use all peaceful means to convey their disgust at the publication of the cartoons. It also asks the media and governments of Europe to respond positively to the deeply held concerns of Muslim citizens. (http://www.eastlondonmosque.org.uk/main/index.php, accessed February 14, 2006)

The mosque’s leaders sought to distance themselves from the radical Hizbut Tahir organisers of the demonstration outside the Danish Embassy where banners praised Muslim terrorists, called for the execution of those blaspheming the Prophet Muhammad and castigated western secularism. Likewise, although a few secularists have rejected Islam as both a mode of practice and a set of beliefs, many more observe Muslim public practices and refuse to accept that Islam in Britain should be confined to the private realm of belief and domestic practice. Some are clearly deeply opposed to the ELM but they have many other mosques which they can support. There is no agreed hierarchy or central organisation representing Muslim interests in the area despite the ELM’s claims to be East London’s premier religious centre.

Amid all the media attention given to Islam in Britain and elsewhere, in this area of London at least secularist Bangladeshis enjoy far stronger position within local state institutions than those associated with the local mosques. They have been appointed to white collar jobs in the public sector, such as the National Health Service, education and the borough council. They also control the vast majority of community groups, clubs and law centres providing advice to Bangladeshis residents about how to gain access to welfare
resources or leisure facilities to the third generation. Secularists dominate the various housing cooperatives, which became increasingly important during the 1990s as the borough council’s housing role declined. Islamists are limited in their range of possible allies if they want to insist on the binary opposition between secularism and Islam. In practice, then, moderate Islamists have also sought to build alliances with non-Muslims involved in the distribution of public funds through such initiatives as the drugs rehabilitation programme and work training courses rather than remain within a narrowly defined Muslim enclave.

The Sacralisation of British Space and New Forms of Pilgrimage

In the previous case study the focus was on the ways in which religious identity became the subject of competing claims between secularists and Islamists. The process of Islamisation had many other dimensions, of course. It has to be seen in the context of a more general purificatory process where the rural syncretic traditions of the Bangladeshi first generation were challenged by those who sought conformity to textual authority based on the Koran and Hadith. Despite the onslaught of this purificatory process syncretic traditions still survived among the first generation and were sustained by the periodical visits of religious leaders associated with Bangladeshi pilgrimage shrines. Furthermore, the supporters of these leaders still influenced their children among the second generation and were associated with the dominant Barelvi persuasion within the urban mosques.

There was even evidence that pilgrimage cults were being transferred to Britain’s urban centres through these continuing influences on Muslims. This sacralisation of Britain by non-Christian settlers was even more obvious among Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists. Old buildings in urban and rural locales were adapted for religious ceremonies while new temples and gurudwaras were built. In some cases pilgrimages were made to these both types of buildings while some of Britain’s rivers were sanctified so that Hindus could scatter the ashes of their loved ones rather than make the long journey back to India.

The dominance long enjoyed by the Church of England was being challenged not only by the secularisation of mainstream society but also by the rise of Christian Pentecostalist, Roman Catholic, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist minority groups in Britain’s cities and towns. These ‘new ethnicities’ encouraged the growth of pilgrimage activity as recent settlers went to shrines overseas or even within Britain itself.

Polish Migrants, Pilgrimage and Transnational Links

To illustrate more clearly this process I will focus on another migrant group – Polish Catholics – and changes taking place at one particular shrine in the Kent countryside thirty miles south of London. Here the rural met the urban as many of the pilgrims came from London parishes where white Catholics mixed with the first generation of Poles had settled at the end of the Second World War and more recent settlers from India, W. Africa and Latin America.

The shrine of Our Lady and St Simon Stock was located forty miles south of London and three miles near the substantial and growing town of Maidstone/Ashford. Access was easy since the shrine was close to a motorway and railway line linking the southern port of Folkestone with London. The shrine was set in pretty grounds near the village of Aylesford and was a mixture of the mediaeval remains of a Carmelite friary dedicated to the English saint, Simon Stock, and 20th century additions. Space was provided for the ceremonies which involved the day pilgrims as well as pilgrim guests occupying the modern lodgings. Like most European pilgrimage shrines this one was dedicated to Our Lady, the mother of Jesus Christ, but also to an Englishman about whom much more was known since he lived in the 13th century.

The following discussion is based on a paper given at a 2005 conference in Teheran.
century and his life as a hermit was faithfully recorded by his fellow Carmelites, an order of celibate friars founded in 1242. He was born in Kent and died in Bordeaux, France. During his long life he journeyed to Rome and to Mount Carmel in Palestine before becoming head of his Order an election held at Aylesford. Under his leadership the Carmelites established houses of study at the universities of Cambridge, Oxford, Paris and Bologna.

The revival of the shrine began in 1949 when Carmelites left France and settled at Aylesford. A strong link was quickly forged with the Poles who decided to remain in Britain after the end of the Second World War. Most had fought in the Polish armed forces on the side of the Allies and were not prepared to return to a Communist-run Poland. They set up communities in London and other cities, although a significant proportion also found work in mines and farms away from these great urban centres. The Roman Catholic faith helped to sustain their community spirit and the long tradition of pilgrimage to the famous Polish Marian shrine of Częstochowa was transferred to Aylesford. One of the British Polish magazines recently described this process in the following way:

When after WWII the epoch of exile began for Poles on British soil, they quickly developed a true friendship with the Order of Our Lady of Mt. Carmel. Carmelites came to Aylesford in November 1949 from France to their ancient nest which was taken from them over 400 years ago by Henry VIII. Poles, with Marian hearts, deeply understanding [the Carmelite] exile, took active part in rebuilding the ruined Church and convent. Many of them helped also financially. *Gazeta Niedzielna*, Sept. 2002 (trans. by M. Garapich)

The specific link with Częstochowa was celebrated by the Head of the Polish Church in England and Wales, Fr Kukla, in a recent sermon at the shrine when he rhetorically sought to bring the survivors of the Second World War with more recent migrants. He began by addressing the veterans:

We wish in this pilgrimage to offer to God - by the intercession of Immaculate Mary - those who 60 years ago in defence of the freedom and sovereignty of our Fatherland, paid the tribute of their blood. We offer in this Mass also you, dear combatants, the generation who found itself abroad. The Sanctuary of Our Lady of Mt. Carmel in Aylesford was and still is the Polish Częstochowa. Here, after a difficult war experience, you rebuilt your faith in God and the faith in humans and faith in human dignity. We bow our heads for you.

He then turned to those who came during the 1980s when political disaffection led by Solidarnosc (Solidarity) was crushed by the regime:

We would like to offer also through the intercession of Our Lady of Częstochowa, those who call themselves Solidarity Emigration. It was you who took into hearts the words of the Slavic Pope [Pope John Paul II]: 'Do not be afraid. You came here expelled from your Fatherland and for long years you experienced the bitterness of emigration lives and then you found your dignity.'

He then moved on to address those who had come to Britain during the 1990s after the collapse of the Communist regime:

And you, who call yourselves, the John Paul II generation, you have a special task in new Europe to maintain a really Christian culture in your country of settlement. You have to defend yourselves strongly against a consumerist way of life, which always brings moral and spiritual emptiness. Your input in the life abroad should be a positive, Christian model of the family, which should shape the life of the Polish Diaspora.
He finally turned to those who had arrived more recently:

I address these words also to these who came to Great Britain for economic reasons, after bread. I welcome you from all my heart. Let yourself be known at Holy Mass, involve yourself in the liturgical life of your parish. Church is your second home, where you often seek support and consolation. Youth is a great gift but a duty also. Don’t be tempted by what is easy and pleasant. Take care of your spirit … Your conversations should be an example of the culture of language and costumes. Take care of the good name of Poland, your Mother.

We see here the attempt by a religious leader to sustain the feelings of *communitas* (see Turner 1978). Through these kinds of sermons as well as religious ceremonies the pilgrims’ membership of both the universal Church and the Polish nation was celebrated.

Yet despite the emphasis on group solidarity the inevitable political and social tensions within the community lurked beneath the surface and are revealed in Fr. Kukla’s call to the 1990s generation and recent migrants to avoid consumerism and bad behaviour. The first generation of military veterans and their families had little in common with the more recent arrivals since they had supported a government-in-exile deeply opposed to the Communist regime which ruled Poland between 1947 and 1990 and rarely, if ever, visited their country of origin. Politically, they shared the same hostility to the regime as the Solidarity Emigration but they were far more wedded to pre-Second World War lifestyles than these younger émigrés, who had lived under Communism for over thirty years.

They had even less in common with the ‘John Paul 11 generation’ and the recent newcomers who had grown up after the collapse of Communism and were eager to leave the pre- and post-Second World War regimes far behind them. They were formally attached to the Roman Catholic Church, which had long been the bastion of Polish national identity, and appreciated the role played by Czestochowa as a place where pilgrims could celebrate their religious and nationalist resistance to outside domination. However, religion appeared to be less embedded within the everyday rhythms of their lives. They did not necessarily seek to participate in the community life of Polish urban communities and many of the recent migrants were scattered across Britain far away from these communities. They wanted to prosper materially and return to a more wealthy and secure future in Poland. The conservative world of the established British Polish community represented through Fr Kukla’s address at Aylesford was not their world. They would have listened to his sermon with due respect but not necessarily agreed with him. Beneath the formal *communitas* there lay a continuing current of disagreement and even antagonism (see Eade and Sallnow 1991 and Coleman and Eade 2004).

References


