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| Fulltext, Revised |
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PDF (requires Acrobat Reader) |
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Fulltext, Revised |
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| Author: |
Michael Thielscher |
| Article title: |
A Theory of Dynamic Diagnosis |
| Publ. type: |
Article |
| Volume: |
2 |
| Article No: |
11 |
| Language: |
English |
| Abstract [en]: |
Diagnosis is, in general, more than a mere passive reasoning
task. It often requires to actively produce observations by performing a
test series on a faulty system. We present a theory of diagnosis which captures
this dynamic aspect by appealing to Action Theory. The reactions of a system
under healthy condition are modeled as indirect effects, so-called ramifications,
of actions performed by the diagnostician. Under abnormal circumstances
- i.e., if certain aspects or components of the system are faulty-one or
more of these ramifications fail to materialize. Ramifications admitting
exceptions is shown to giving rise to a hitherto unnoticed challenge - a
challenge much like the one raised by the famous Yale Shooting counter-example
in the context of the Frame Problem. Meeting this challenge is inevitable
when searching for "good" diagnoses. As a solution, we adapt from a recent
causality-based solution to the Qualification Problem the key principle
of initial minimization. In this way, when suggesting a diagnosis
our theory of dynamic diagnosis exploits causal information, in addition
to possibly available, qualitative knowledge of the a priori likelihood
of components to fail.
Some of the results in this paper have been preliminarily reported
in (Thielscher, 1997a). |
| PDF |
| Publisher: |
Linköping University Electronic Press |
| Year: |
1997 |
| Available: |
1997-10-07, Revised 1998-03-02 |
| No. of pages: |
26, Revised 28 |
| Series: |
Linköping Electronic Articles in Computer and Information Science |
| ISSN: |
1401-9841 |
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